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THE NEXT “BIG SHORT”:
COVID-19, STUDENT LOAN
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY, AND
THE SLABS MARKET
Samantha L. Bailey & Christopher J. Ryan, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
Even before the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, student loan debt—
totaling over $1.64 trillion—was a cause for concern, as it is the second
largest source of consumer debt in the United States, trailing only mortgage
debt. And like collateralized mortgage debt, there is a market for collateral-
ized student debt. Student loan asset-backed securities (SLABS) are the
securitized form of student loan debt, repackaged as a marketable financial
instrument. As with any investment vehicle, asset-backed securities like
SLABS come with risk, particularly when borrowers default on their loans
or have their debt discharged through bankruptcy proceedings. However,
historically, SLABS have been a relatively sure bet—yielding consistent re-
turns on investment—given that many student loans are guaranteed by the
government and that student loan debt obligations are difficult for borrow-
ers to escape. This is because there has been a long-standing and near-total
prohibition on student loan discharge via bankruptcy proceedings. A spate
of recent decisions rendered in the United States Bankruptcy Courts and
two federal circuit courts of appeal could eliminate that prohibition. In
turn, this decision could negatively impact the SLABS market, and in a
broader sense, the United States economy.
This Article addresses this possibility, especially in light of the fact that
rising unemployment in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis is sure to in-
crease the rate of default on student loans. Part II of this Article describes
the present student loan crisis in terms of available statistics and common
student loan repayment programs. Next, Part III chronicles the develop-
ment and operation of bankruptcy law in the context of student loans. Part
III also explains the general unwillingness to discharge student loans in
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bankruptcy proceedings via the Brunner test. Part IV focuses on student
loan asset-backed securities: what they are, how they operate, and how they
generate profit. This final section draws the connection between student
loan discharge via bankruptcy and its potential impacts on the SLABS
market and the economy at large. This Article concludes with observations
about how the current crisis levels of student loan debt, when combined
with rising unemployment and recent bankruptcy court decisions, could
impact the stability of the SLABS market and the broader economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IF the title of this Article sounds familiar, it is probably because youhave heard it before. In finance, short-selling—or “shorting”—astock refers to an investor borrowing stock shares to sell in the hope
that the shares can be purchased later at a lower price. These shares are
then returned to the shareholding lender, and the investor can profit from
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the difference between the sale price and the purchase price.1 In other
words, a “short” is a bet by the investor that the stock will decrease in
value, the shareholder will be no worse off in terms of shares held, and
the investor will gain from the sell-off.2 Film director Adam McKay’s The
Big Short—and the Michael Lewis book of the same name—chronicles
the lives of financiers prior to the “Great Recession” of 2008.3 These fin-
anciers, including physician-turned-hedge-fund-manager Michael Burry,
spotted the “housing bubble” before most other investors and predicted
the impending market collapse that resulted from the subprime mortgage
crisis.4 They did so by spotting patterns: Mortgage originators issued
loans to subprime borrowers so that the loans could be bundled and sold
to firms that securitized the mortgage loans.5 The securitized loans were
then packaged into tranches by credit risk, through dubious rating prac-
tices, and offered to investors as mortgage-backed securities and syn-
thetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).6 These mortgage-backed
securities and CDOs amplified investor risk, given the increased exposure
to underlying assets that were themselves dangerous gambles.7 Thus,
these hedge fund managers devised a plan to short the riskiest tranches of
the mortgage-backed securities through credit swaps, since these securi-
ties would become profitable when the market ultimately collapsed.8 Ef-
fectively, they bet against the big banks, which issued mortgage-backed
securities as investment vehicles in the securities market, as well as the
American economy. Their prediction proved to be lucrative, as the econ-
omy indeed stalled for several years after the housing bubble burst.
We recognize that the first part of the title of this Article suggests that
this Article has something to do with shorting mortgage bonds. We do not
mean to mislead you, dear reader, but this Article is not about shorting
1. See, e.g., Joshua Kennon, The Basics of Shorting Stock: A Beginner’s Guide for
How to Short Stocks, BALANCE (May 27, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/the-basics-of-
shorting-stock-356327 [https://perma.cc/4PG3-3QTT] (discussing how stocks are short-
sold).
2. See, e.g., Philip van Doorn, Why You Should Never Short-Sell Stocks,
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 27, 2015, 9:16 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-you-
should-never-short-sell-stocks-2015-11-19 [https://perma.cc/6D5T-26SM] (defining short-
selling securities).
3. See, e.g., Jon Hartley, ‘The Big Short’ Shines a Light on the Financial Crisis with
Good Humor, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/
2015/11/29/the-big-short-shines-a-light-on-the-financial-crisis-with-good-humor/#12c74c23
67d6 [https://perma.cc/VVC3-ADAY].
4. Michael Lewis, Betting on the Blind Side, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 1, 2010), https://
www.vanityfair.com/news/2010/04/wall-street-excerpt-201004 [https://perma.cc/PCL3-
FNQ9].
5. What Role Did Securitization Play in the Global Financial Crisis?, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 30, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/041515/what-role-did-securitiza
tion-play-us-subprime-mortgage-crisis.asp [https://perma.cc/WK32-G2JQ].
6. James Chen, Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO), INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/syntheticcdo.asp [https://perma.cc/
XV65-Y9ZZ] (noting the role that synthetic CDOs played in the subprime mortgage
crisis).
7. Id.
8. Id.; Lewis, supra note 4.
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securities or even explicitly about mortgage-backed securities. However,
the financial crisis in the 2008 recession is relevant as a corollary to the
topic of this Article, especially because we are now in the midst of one of
the greatest periods of economic uncertainty in history.9 Mortgage-
backed securities are once again in a cycle of negative convexity as inter-
est rates continue to fall, and the prices of these bonds fall along with
them.10 But mortgage debt is just one of the many consumer-debt sectors
afflicted by the financial implications of the global COVID-19 pandemic.
After mortgage debt, student-loan debt is the largest source of consumer
debt in the United States.11 Like mortgage-backed securities, student
loan asset-backed securities (SLABS) are the securitized form of student
loan debt, repackaged as a marketable financial instrument.12 Traditional
lenders, including Sallie Mae, and those newer to the scene, such as SoFi,
bundle student loans and securitize them in the same way that mortgage-
backed securities and other collateralized debt obligations are issued to
investors.13 Like mortgage-backed securities, SLABS are backed by in-
come streams generated by student loan payments made by individual
borrowers.14 As with any investment vehicle, SLABS come with risk, par-
9. See, e.g., Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, Stephen J. Davis & Stephen J. Terry,
COVID-Induced Economic Uncertainty (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
26983, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26983 [https://perma.cc/ULA9-WNUE] (ana-
lyzing the impact of stock market volatility, newspaper-based economic uncertainty, and
subjective uncertainty in business expectation surveys on the economy).
10. See, e.g., Mark Kolakowski, Mortgage-Backed Bonds That Spurred 2008 Crisis Are
in Trouble Again, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/why-
mortgage-backed-bonds-that-spurred-2008-crisis-are-in-trouble-again-4770040 [https://
perma.cc/VK9U-HW9K].
11. Matt Egan, Americans Now Have a Record $14 Trillion in Debt, CNN BUS. (Nov.
13, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/13/business/household-debt-student-loans-fed/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/6PBH-KJN9]. This is not a new occurrence; student loan debt
has occupied the second largest share of consumer debt for several years. See Student Loan
Debt by Age Group, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
studentloandebt/index.html [https://perma.cc/9HNB-2NVV] (noting that student loan debt
eclipsed both auto loans and credit card debt in 2012 and has held fast as the second largest
sector of consumer debt ever since); see also Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics
in 2020: A Record $1.6 Trillion, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2020, 6:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/zackfriedman/2020/02/03/student-loan-debt-statistics/#42ab3b38281f [https://perma.cc/
W8F8-B547].
12. Jack Du, Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities: Safe or Subprime?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/081815/student-loan-asset
backed-securities-safe-or-subprime.asp [https://perma.cc/NF2K-548S].
13. See Tom Arnold, Bonnie G. Buchanan & J. Fiona Robertson, The Economics of
Sallie Mae, 18 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 65 (2012). See generally Francesco Pizzini, SLABS—
The Student Loan Securitization Market in the US, RESEARCHGATE 18–19 (Mar. 2019),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332514418 [https://perma.cc/P82P-SKGG]. For a
discussion of recent SLABS issuances by big lenders and newer lenders, see Glen Fest,
Sallie Mae Launches $433M SLABS Issuance, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://asreport.americanbanker.com/news/sallie-mae-launches-433m-slabs-issuance
[https://perma.cc/KAC7-8CTZ], and see also Glen Fest, SoFi Launches $1B Refi SLABS
Deal, the Lender’s Largest to Date, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://
asreport.amricanbanker.com/news/sofi-launches-1b-refi-slabs-deal-the-lenders-largest-to-
date [https://perma.cc/V87H-H3S3].
14. Both SLABS and mortgage-backed securities rely on income streams derived from
borrowers repaying their loans. However, mortgage-backed securities have the benefit of
the borrower putting up the underlying collateral—for example, a house—while SLABS
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ticularly when borrowers default on their loans or have their debt dis-
charged through bankruptcy proceedings, and are rated by credit rating
agencies to evidence the level of risk they carry.15 However, student loan
debt has historically been a relatively sure bet—yielding consistent re-
turns on investment—given the presumption that student loans are guar-
anteed by the government and student loan debt obligations are difficult
for borrowers to escape.16 This is because there has been a long-standing
and near-total prohibition on student loan discharge via bankruptcy.17
Three recent decisions—one rendered by the Chief Judge of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York and two
rendered by separate three-judge panels of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit, respectively—could
eliminate that virtual prohibition. In turn, these decisions, and the nega-
tive economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, could negatively im-
pact the SLABS market, and in a broader sense, the United States
economy.
do not. See Philip R. Stein, Kenneth Duvall, From RMBS to SLABS: Is History Repeating
Itself?, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/rmbs-to-slabs-
history-repeating-itself [https://perma.cc/4BEG-9FBY]; see also Mortgage-Backed Securi-
ties, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/types-investments/bonds/
types-of-bonds/mortgage-backed-securities [https://perma.cc/2R82-5BLX].
15. See, e.g., Prachi Talathi & Jinwen Chen, Moody’s Downgrades Class 2010 A-1-7
Issued by New Mexico Educational Assistance Foundation, and Continues to Keep It on
Review, MOODY’S (June 19, 2020), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-down-
grades-Class-2010-A-1-7-issued-by-New—PR_426902 [https://perma.cc/9M6W-TYW2]
(discussing Moody’s decision to downgrade a particular class of student loan bonds by one
issuer due to expected loss to the tranche); Edward Bankole & Andrew Lipton, Moody’s
Rates Academic Management Services Student Loan Securitization, Aaa, MOODY’S (Feb.
12, 2002), https://www.moodys.com/research/MOODYS-RATES-ACADEMIC-MAN-
AGEMENT-SERVICES-STUDENT-LOAN-SECURITIZATION-Aaa—PR_52890
[https://perma.cc/M7TK-Q3RN] (rating over $335 million of then newly issued SLABS as
“Aaa,” the agency’s highest rating).
16. Most student loans are federally guaranteed; however, less than 10% of all student
loan debt is held by private lenders, which is non-guaranteed. See Bankole & Lipton, supra
note 15.
17. Many types of debts can be discharged in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceedings, including mortgage debt. Ordinarily, liens, back-taxes, child support, and ali-
mony cannot be discharged. See Discharge in Bankruptcy–Bankruptcy Basics, U.S.
COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-
bankruptcy-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/EN5T-64F4]; see also What Debt Cannot
Be Discharged When Filing for Bankruptcy?, INVESTOPEDIA (May 20, 2020), https://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/102814/what-debt-cannot-be-discharged-when-filing-
bankruptcy.asp [https://perma.cc/KQ2M-69H8]. Student loans are very, very rarely, if ever,
discharged through bankruptcy proceedings. See Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment
of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495,
505 (2012) (noting that only 0.1% of debtors even challenge the nondischargeability of
their student loans). But see Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to
Justice, Procedural Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 2101, 2124–35, 2129 n.176 (2014) (arguing that the Iuliano study undercounted stu-
dent loan proceedings). In fact, to the extent that a borrower’s student loans are discharged
in extremely limited cases in bankruptcy proceedings, it could be the case that this dis-
charge stems from settlement agreements between borrowers and creditors that do not
require judicial determinations of the borrower’s undue hardship. See Aaron N. Taylor &
Daniel J. Sheffner, Oh, What a Relief It (Sometimes) Is: An Analysis of Chapter 7 Bank-
ruptcy Petitions to Discharge Student Loans, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 297 (2016).
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This Article addresses this possibility, especially in light of the fact that
rising unemployment in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis is sure to in-
crease the rate of default on student loans. Part II of this Article de-
scribes the present student loan crisis in terms of available statistics and
common student loan repayment programs. In addition, Part II of this
Article explores what options are available when borrowers are unable to
repay their loans—fully or in part—including income-based repayment
programs, forbearance, and default. Next, Part III chronicles the develop-
ment and operation of bankruptcy law in the context of student loans.
Further, Part III of this Article explains how the Brunner test has resulted
in all but a total prohibition against the discharge of student loans in
bankruptcy proceedings. Part IV focuses on student loan asset-backed se-
curities: what they are, how they operate, and how they generate profit.
Lastly, this final part will draw the connection between student loan dis-
charge via bankruptcy and its potential impacts on the SLABS market
and the economy at large. This Article concludes with observations about
how the current crisis levels of student loan debt, when combined with
rising unemployment and recent bankruptcy court decisions, could im-
pact the stability of the SLABS market and the broader economy.
II. STUDENT LOANS IN CONTEXT
A. TRILLIONS OF REASONS
Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the upward trajec-
tory of consumer debt approached worrisome levels, growing markedly
every quarter since late 2013 to over $14 trillion.18 The proportion of this
debt accounted for by student loans has also systematically increased
every year since the early 2000s. In fact, the amount of outstanding stu-
dent loans in the United States has doubled in the last decade and has
tripled since 2006.19 Student loan debt is the second largest source of con-
sumer debt—more than triple the fourth largest consumer debt category,
credit card debt, and over $200 billion more than the third largest con-
sumer debt category, auto loans.20 Today, in the United States, 44.7 mil-
18. See, e.g., Mark DeCambre, U.S. Consumer Debt Is Now Above Levels Hit During
the 2008 Financial Crisis, MARKETWATCH (June 25, 2019, 9:12 PM), https://www.mar
ketwatch.com/story/us-consumer-debt-is-now-breaching-levels-last-reached-during-the-
2008-financial-crisis-2019-06-19 [https://perma.cc/Q5RS-35LR]; see also Friedman, supra
note 11.
19. See, e.g., Lauren Theisen, Study: Barely Anyone is Paying Off Their Student Loans,
and the Debt Keeps Rising, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020), https://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ny-barely-anyone-is-paying-off-their-student-loans-
20200117-743fvux7ijae5jnrdyecoe6ypy-story.html [https://perma.cc/8754-4ED7].
20. See, e.g., Magdelena Szmigiera, Value of Debt Owned by Consumers in the United
States as of September 2019, by Type, STATISTA (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/500814/debt-owned-by-consumers-usa-by-type/ [https://perma.cc/554F-TB3S];
Zack Friedman, Wait, My Student Loans Went up After 5 Years?, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2020,
8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2020/02/10/student-loans-balance-in
crease/#2096a1884625 [https://perma.cc/4HTR-KKMX].
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lion borrowers owe approximately $1.6 trillion in student loan debt.21
Student loans affect graduates of every type of higher education insti-
tution and at every level of higher education. In fact, only three out of
every ten college graduates leave their undergraduate institutions without
student loan debt.22 While 66% of public college graduates end up with
student loan debt, 75% of non-profit college graduates carry student loan
debt after graduation.23 And 88% of those who graduated from for-profit
colleges incur student loan debt.24
This year, the average student loan debt per borrower is $32,731—cost-
ing borrowers on a standard repayment plan around $383 per month, on
average.25 But this average masks the fact that student loan debt
amounts—and in turn, monthly payment amounts—vary wildly depend-
ing on a host of factors including repayment status,26 race,27 gender,28
21. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11. We should note here that over 11% of all stu-
dent debt is securitized, based on 2019 numbers. See Fixed Income Outstanding, SIFMA,
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/fixed-income-chart/ [https://perma.cc/P5MB-
TTF4] (listing the student loan ABS market at $158.9 billion).
22. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11.
23. Id.; see Matthew P. Diehr, The Looming Threat Posed to Student Loan Lenders
and Servicers by State-Level Actors in an Era of Federal Regulatory Remission, 65 FED.
LAW. 42, 43 (2018). In fact, the average college graduate of the class of 2016 owed 70%
more in student loan debt than the average member of the Class of 2006. Id. at 45.
24. Friedman, supra note 11; Adrej Bastrikin, Student Loan Debt Statistics, EDUCA-
TIONDATA.ORG (Apr. 12, 2020), https://educationdata.org/student-loan-debt-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/P62J-FMME].
25. Friedman, supra note 11; Bastrikin, supra note 24.
26. See Stefan Lembo Stolba, Only Half of All Student Loans Are Currently in Repay-
ment, EXPERIAN (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/research/
student-loan-debt-and-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/FJ8J-Y3CG ] (noting that only 55.8%
of outstanding student loans are in repayment, which means that monthly payment
amounts for many borrowers is $0).
27. See ROBERT HILTONSMITH, DEMOS SMALL LOANS, BIG RISKS: MAJOR CONSE-
QUENCES FOR STUDENT DEBTORS 2, 6 (2017), https://www.demos.org/research/small-loans-
big-risks-major-consequences-student-debtors [https://perma.cc/ZE86-UNWM] (noting
that “[b]orrowers of color face greater difficulty repaying their loans”); Jason N. Houle &
Fenaba R. Addo, Racial Disparities in Student Debt and the Reproduction of the Fragile
Black Middle Class, 5 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 562 (2018) (focusing on how student
loan debt affects black youth); Janice McCabe & Brandon A. Jackson, Pathways to Financ-
ing College: Race and Class in Students’ Narratives of Paying for School, 3 SOC. CURRENTS
367, 367–68 (2016) (focusing primarily on differences between white and African-Ameri-
can students); DEMOS, LATINOS, STUDENT DEBT, AND FINANCIAL SECURITY (2016), https:/
/www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Latinos%20Student%20Debt%20and%20
Financial%20Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5MY-WHBG] (focusing on the impact of stu-
dent loans on Latinos).
28. See KEVIN MILLER, AM. ASS’N UNIV. WOMEN, DEEPER IN DEBT: WOMEN AND
STUDENT LOANS, 1, 36 (2017), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580345.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9TVR-TT8C] (noting that two-thirds of all student loan debt is held by women);
see also Valerie Fontenot, Disparities in Student Loans: How Did We Get Here and What
Can We Do?, ABA J. (July 16, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/com
mittees/diversity-inclusion/articles/2019/summer2019-disparities-in-student-loans/ [https://
perma.cc/33GP-RRZ3].
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socioeconomic status,29 and education level.30 When looking at borrow-
ing statistics, clear patterns emerge with respect to who is most likely to
incur student loans to finance a postsecondary education, and equally as
apparent is who is most likely to be able to meet their repayment
obligations.
B. STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENT
Even for borrowers enrolled in a repayment plan that results in loan
forgiveness, when students borrow funds to help pay for their cost of at-
tendance at a postsecondary institution, it is with the intention of being
able to pay back most, if not all, of these funds once they obtain adequate
post-graduate employment. Repayment is easier for some borrowers than
it is for others and depends on whether borrowers graduate from their
respective higher education institutions to begin with and whether they
secure employment, as well as their post-graduate earnings and living ex-
penses. Since 2010, most student loans have been issued under the Fed-
eral Direct Loan Program, meaning that when the loan enters repayment,
the borrower pays back the federal government through an approved
loan servicer. Once payments on a borrower’s student loans become due,
by default, student loans are entered into the Standard Repayment Plan.
Under the default terms of this repayment plan, the borrower will be ex-
pected to pay back the same amount each month over ten years, or 120
monthly payments.31 The largest concentration of borrowers—about 12.5
million—are enrolled in the Standard Repayment Plan, which is often
called the “level repayment plan” because the monthly repayment
29. See, e.g., Dirk Witteveen & Paul Attewell, Social Dimensions of Student Debt: A
Data Mining Analysis, 49 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 1, 16–17 (2019); Jason N. Houle, Disparities
in Debt: Parents’ Socioeconomic Resources and Young Adult Student Loan Debt, 87 SOC.
EDUC. 53, 55 (2013) (“Children from middle-income families make too much money to
qualify for student aid packages, but they do not have the financial means to cover the
costs of college.”); see also Hillary Hoffower, 6 Findings That Show the Dire State of
America’s Middle Class, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/
america-shrinking-middle-class-debt-homeownership-retirement-savings-2019-5 [https://
perma.cc/ZYY6-8S65] (noting that “nearly half” of middle-class students have student
loans, compared to 39% of affluent students).
30. For example, aspiring lawyers borrow an average in excess of $115,000 to pay for
their formal legal educations. Law School Costs, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, https://
data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/debt/ [https://perma.cc/82L6-V78U]. For further dis-
cussion of the impact of student loans on the careers of law school graduates, see Christo-
pher J. Ryan, Jr., Paying for Law School: Law Student Loan Indebtedness and Career
Choices, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). Likewise, in 2017, the average medical
school graduate took on over $190,000 in student loan debt—costs which only continue to
increase with rising tuition rates. See, e.g., Kevin Payne, Average Medical School Debt:
How Much It Really Costs to Be a Doctor, STUDENT LOAN PLANNER (Feb. 7, 2020), https://
www.studentloanplanner.com/average-medical-school-debt/ [https://perma.cc/GBD8-
34YL].
31. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11; see also Ryan Lane, What Is the Standard Re-
payment Plan on Student Loans?, NERDWALLET (Mar. 25, 2019), https://
www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/student-loans/standard-repayment-plan-student-loans/
[https://perma.cc/X2CL-JLNG]; Max Fay, Income-Based Repayment of Student Loans,
DEBT.ORG, https://www.debt.org/students/income-based-repayment-loans/ [https://
perma.cc/2W3D-TZVB].
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amounts do not change over time.32 This repayment structure is most ad-
vantageous for student borrowers who graduate and immediately secure
employment that compensates them with enough income to cover their
student loan debt obligations on top of their cost of living.33 This plan
also allows borrowers a way to avoid paying an exorbitant amount of
interest; however, when graduates are underemployed—or otherwise do
not receive adequate compensation enabling them to repay their loans—
there are alternative repayment plans into which the borrower may enter.
These plans include Graduated Repayment, Income-Contingent Repay-
ment, Income-Based Repayment, Pay As You Earn, and Revised Pay As
You Earn, which are described in detail below.34
Even though the majority of people remain in the Standard Repay-
ment Plan by default, there are seven additional repayment plans that can
be elected by borrowers.35 The most popular alternative repayment plans
are Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE) and Income-Based Repayment
(IBR), in which 2.8 million and 2.9 million borrowers are enrolled, re-
spectively.36 Using these plans, borrowers can significantly lower their
monthly payments.37 These plans calculate a borrower’s monthly pay-
ments based on a certain percentage of a borrower’s “discretionary”
monthly income.38 Discretionary income, for the purpose of these pro-
grams, is the difference between a borrower’s annual income and 150%
of the poverty guideline for that borrower’s respective state and family
size.39 Under either of these plans, if a borrower earns less than 150% of
the poverty level for their respective family size, the borrower is not re-
quired to pay anything on her loan for as long as their financial situation
persists.40
IBR was created in 2009 and is available to federal student loan bor-
rowers with either direct loans or loans through the Federal Family Edu-
cation Loan Program (FFELP).41 Depending on whether or not the
borrower is a new borrower as of July 1, 2014, the expected IBR monthly
payment is calculated to be between 10% and 15% of the borrower’s
32. Friedman, supra note 11.
33. See, e.g., Camilo Maldonado, A Guide to Federal Student Loan Repayment Plans,
FORBES (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/loans/a-guide-to-federal-
student-loan-repayment-plans/ [https://perma.cc/F9LL-FZ88].
34. See id.
35. See id.; see also Repayment Plans: Choose the Federal Student Loan Repayment
Plan That’s Best for You, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/repay
ment/plans [https://perma.cc/SV8X-XA3Y].
36. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11.
37. Maldonado, supra note 33.
38. See, e.g., id.
39. Id.
40. What Are These Programs?, IBRINFO, http://www.ibrinfo.org/what.vp.html [https://
perma.cc/QA5Y-94S7].
41. See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 203, 121 Stat.
784, 792–95 (2007) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e) (setting forth the require-
ments for the IBR program); see also Income-Driven Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT
AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/repayment/plans/income-driven [https://
perma.cc/ZD9V-H29G]; What Are These Programs?, supra note 40.
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monthly discretionary income.42 IBR has a safeguard that ensures that a
borrower’s monthly payment will never be more than what they would
pay under the Standard Repayment Plan.43 Under this plan, borrowers
must recertify their income annually and the required monthly payment
amount will continuously recalculate based on the borrower’s current in-
come.44 After twenty-five years of qualifying payments, loans under an
IBR plan are eligible for discharge via forgiveness.45 Although forgive-
ness is a helpful remedy, there are obvious negative externalities that sur-
face in relation to the program’s tax ramifications.46
In many respects, the REPAYE program operates along the same lines
as the IBR program. Under REPAYE, a borrower’s discretionary income
calculation is derived in the same way that IBR calculates discretionary
income, and a borrower’s monthly payment is capped at 10% of the bor-
rower’s discretionary monthly income.47 However, under REPAYE, the
repayment period depends on whether or not the borrower has student
loans from undergraduate or graduate studies.48 If the borrower has ex-
clusively undergraduate loans, the repayment period is twenty years.49 If
any of the loans originated from the borrower’s graduate studies, the re-
payment period increases to a total of twenty-five years.50 But REPAYE
is distinct from IBR in another key respect: there is no cap on monthly
payment amounts.51 This means that if a borrower’s income increases
substantially, the borrower’s monthly payments under a REPAYE plan
could potentially exceed what their monthly payments would be under
the default Standard Repayment Plan.52
That said, REPAYE and IBR remain wildly popular repayment op-
tions, especially for borrowers who have low-to-moderate incomes and
large amounts of student loan debt.53 However, both IBR and REPAYE
plans have considerable downsides that may be overlooked by many bor-
rowers who enroll in these repayment plans early in their loan repayment
periods because the severity of the following negative effects are not seen
until much later in their repayment period. The adverse effects associated
with these programs can impact a borrower’s ability to repay the bor-
42. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 33.
43. Id.
44. See Repayment Plans, supra note 35; see also What Are These Programs?, supra
note 40.
45. What Are These Programs?, supra note 40.
46. See infra Section I.C.1.
47. See, e.g., Rebecca Lake, REPAYE Could Lower Your Student Loan Payments—
Here’s How, FOX BUS. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/repaye-lower-
student-loan-payments [https://perma.cc/SXM5-VUR7]; see also Maldonado, supra note
33.
48. See Maldonado, supra note 33.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Elyssa Kirkham, What Is the REPAYE Plan and How Does It Work?,
BALANCE (July 27, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/revised-pay-as-you-earn-repaye-
4776588 [https://perma.cc/KU7S-RK9A].
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 33.
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rower’s student loans in full, and when these effects arise for many bor-
rowers on a large scale, it could test the limits of the federal guarantee on
many of these loans. As such, these effects are further explored in the
sections below.
1. Never-Ending Interest
One of the most severe consequences of the IBR and REPAYE plans is
substantial interest that accrues on the borrower’s loans even before the
loans enter the repayment period.54 Many borrowers who enrolled in
IBR, REPAYE, or similar types of plans, did so in order to make repay-
ing their student loan debt more manageable.55 Although these plans can
offer short-term relief, these loans can potentially become much more
expensive in the long run because the interest on the loans compounds
when the borrower’s monthly payments do little to repay the principal
balance of the loan amount.56 Borrowers enrolled in these programs have
become discouraged and overwhelmed by the fact that their payments
never seem to make a dent in their loan balances.57 In fact, in many cases,
borrowers enrolled in these repayment plans have seen their total loan
balances increase despite their making the required monthly payments.58
Although student loan originations have decreased, aggregate balances
continue to grow rapidly because borrowers are, in general, taking longer
to repay their existing loans by utilizing repayment plans like IBR and
REPAYE.59 In fact, a recent study by Moody’s Investors Service showed
that almost half of the borrowers who took out loans between 2010 and
2012 have made no progress at all on paying down the principal balance
on their student loans.60 This reality quite significantly impacts the
SLABS market; to the extent that borrowers do not pay off their loans in
time—the outstanding loan amounts of which now total billions of dol-
lars—issuers of SLABS must extend maturity dates to avoid ratings
downgrades.61
54. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 20.
55. See, e.g., id.
56. See, e.g., id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Theisen, supra note 19.
60. See, e.g., Jeff Cox, Student Debt Is Over $1.6 Trillion and Hardly Anyone Is Paying
Down Their Loans, CNBC (Jan. 16, 2020, 6:27 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/16/stu
dent-loan-debt-is-over-1point6-trillion-and-balances-arent-going-down.html [https://
perma.cc/EQD9-GGHS] (discussing how borrowers who took out loans between 2010 and
2012 felt strong effects of the Great Recession which lead to their inability to pay down
their loans and how only 51% of individuals who borrowed during this time have been able
to make any progress in paying down their debts).
61. See Cezary Podkul, A Borrower Will Be 114 When Bonds Backed by Her Student
Loans Mature, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-borrow
er-will-be-114-when-bonds-backed-by-her-student-loans-mature-11578393002 [https://
perma.cc/ZEZ9-RLPT] (describing the practices of SLABS issuers to extend maturity
dates in an effort to avoid downgrading by the credit rating agencies of the investment
vehicles they issued).
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Also, as mentioned above, after making payments for the designated
period of time, borrowers are eligible to receive student loan forgiveness
on the remaining balance of their student loans.62 As the old adage goes,
“if it seems too good to be true, it most likely is.” Borrowers must make
twenty-five years of on-time payments to be eligible for forgiveness.63 Be-
yond even that, student loan forgiveness—which seems to be purely a
boon—is not without its consequences.
2. Student Loan Forgiveness and the “Tax Bomb”
Assume a borrower wanted to lower her monthly payments and thus
decided to enroll in one of the aforementioned alternative repayment
plans. Over twenty-five years, this borrower consistently made on-time,
qualifying payments toward her student loan balance. After making these
300 monthly payments, the borrower’s loan still has a balance of $90,000;
this balance is then forgiven. However, the borrower does not get off
“scot-free,” as one may assume when the word “forgiveness” is used to
describe debt relief. Instead, when the borrower’s student loan balance is
forgiven, all $90,000 of it becomes taxable as income to the borrower.64
By way of an illustration, assume the borrower with a $90,000 remain-
ing student loan balance is a single person with an income $40,000 per
year. Based on the borrower’s salary alone, the borrower would be placed
into the second lowest tax bracket.65 The second lowest tax bracket ap-
plies to single individuals making between $9,876 and $40,125 per year.66
The IRS imposes a 12% tax rate on the income of taxpayers who fall into
this bracket.67 This means that, under normal circumstances, the bor-
rower would be required to pay $4,602.50 in federal income tax in 2020.
62. Note that the period for repayment is typically between twenty and twenty-five
years. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 20.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Ryan Lane, Should You Worry About a ‘Student Loan Forgiveness Tax
Bomb’?, NASDAQ (Jan. 16, 2020, 6:27 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/should-you-
worry-about-a-student-loan-forgiveness-tax-bomb-2020-01-16 [https://perma.cc/K9PU-
GP7V]. However, we should note that there is an exception to the “tax bomb”: where a
debtor is insolvent at the time that a debt is forgiven, the debt forgiveness is not considered
ordinary income and thus, is not taxable. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B). While student loan
forgiveness has generated fairly widespread support, not everyone agrees on whether it
should exist or how it should be implemented. See, e.g., Zack Friedman, Should You Really
Get Student Loan Forgiveness?, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/zackfriedman/2020/01/28/is-student-loan-forgiveness-fair/#303826582017 [https://
perma.cc/XJK4-BM6A] (discussing the arguments for and against student loan forgive-
ness); see also Large Scale Debt Forgiveness May Benefit High Income Borrowers: Higher
Ed Associations, DIVERSE EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://diverseeducation.com/article/
174180/ [https://perma.cc/E6TF-36XW] (reporting on a congressional letter, written by
American Council on Education and thirty-one other higher education institutions, cau-
tioning Congress that large scale debt forgiveness could benefit high income borrowers,
who—in their view—do not require such assistance).
65. These calculations are based on the 2020 Federal Income Tax Brackets. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 1(j); Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1093 (noting the inflation adjustment to
I.R.C. § 1(j) for 2020 for unmarried individuals and single taxpayers at Table 3).
66. See I.R.C. § 1(j); Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1093.
67. See id.
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However, taking the “tax bomb” that loan forgiveness carries into con-
sideration, the borrower’s total income would equal $130,000. This would
cause the borrower to jump up two tax brackets and end up in the $82,526
to $163,300 tax bracket.68 The appropriate tax rate for this new bracket is
24%, or double the tax rate from the borrower’s previous tax bracket.69
This means that the year the borrower’s loans are forgiven, the borrower
would owe $25,279.50 in income tax. In other words, the borrower would
owe more than 63% of her annual salary in income tax, due 120 days
from receipt. In a nutshell, this is the tax bomb, incident to student loan
forgiveness, that the borrower must now pay to the IRS. If the borrower
is unable to pay the borrower’s full tax balance up front, the borrower
can elect to set up an installment plan with the IRS or seek a short-term
extension. However, the borrower will be subject to a monthly penalty
equal to at least 0.25% of the unpaid balance.70
It is important to note that not all alternative repayment plans are sub-
ject to the tax bomb, but the most popular ones—IBR and REPAYE—
are subject to this consequence.71 Unfortunately, many borrowers are un-
aware of this substantial consequence until it is too late. Likewise,
SLABS holders may not be aware of the consequences of forgiveness
either. Given that the federal government backs the debt balance of
FFELP loans, which represent an entire class of SLABS, these SLABS
holders might not expect to incur losses if forgiveness rates remain level.
Nor would SLABS holders have a reason to suspect federal loan forgive-
ness on individual loans could alter the return on a SLABS investment
because investors are functionally protected from noticing the impact of
forgiveness: the government forgives the borrower and pays the loan ser-
vicer, and in turn, pays the SLABS holder. However, there is a very real
possibility that—even if forgiveness rates remain level—a spike in bor-
rowers entering forbearance or deferment, being forgiven of their loans,
or defaulting on them could result in SLABS issuers “fail[ing] to repay
investors[,] . . . something that has never happened before” but may well
be on the horizon.72
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., What Happens If You Owe Taxes?, H&R BLOCK, https://
www.hrblock.com/tax-center/irs/audits-and-tax-notices/owe-the-irs-back-taxes/ [https://
perma.cc/D4BY-UH9K].
71. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 64.
72. See, e.g., Joy Wiltermuth, The Recovery Is Happening, Right? Why $9 Billion of
Student Loan Bonds Just Got Downgraded, MARKETWATCH (June 8, 2020, 12:20 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-recovery-is-happening-right-why-9-billion-of-stu-
dent-loan-bonds-just-got-downgraded-2020-06-05 [https://perma.cc/9TX9-ZHRJ] (discuss-
ing Moody’s recent decision to downgrade “$9 billion worth of bonds made up entirely of
government-backed student loans and t[ake] negative actions on another $2 billion, due to
the ‘contraction in economic activity and an increase in unemployment due to the
coronavirus outbreak’” because the rating agency “thinks the [Federal Family Education
Loans Program (FFELP)] bonds could fail to repay investors at maturity, something that
has never happened before, and could spark a wave of bond defaults”); see also Podkul,
supra note 61.
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C. INABILITY TO MEET REPAYMENT OBLIGATIONS
When borrowers cannot meet their repayment obligations, there are
three principal courses of action by which they can seek relief. These
courses of action include placing their loans in forbearance, entering
deferment, or, ultimately, defaulting on their loans through non-payment.
Because almost no student loan borrowers seek to discharge their student
loans in bankruptcy, given the unlikelihood of doing so successfully, the
first two options—placing student loans in forbearance or deferment—
are the de facto options that borrowers face in the near-term and are
theoretically more optimal than the last option for most borrowers.73
1. Forbearance and Deferment: Short-Term Solutions
As of the third quarter of 2019, 2.8 million borrowers tied up their
loans in forbearance, a process that freezes repayment obligations but
does nothing to stop interest from accruing on student loans.74 The total
owed by those borrowers is equal to approximately $122.9 billion.75
There are two different types of forbearance that apply in the context of
federal student loans: general and mandatory.76 General forbearance,
also known as discretionary forbearance, is obtained when a borrower’s
application is accepted.77 Mandatory forbearance is applied in limited cir-
cumstances, including when the borrower’s payment is more than 20% of
her gross monthly income or when the borrower is a National Guard
member who is activated.78 Forbearance allows borrowers to temporarily
delay their loans.79 During this time, the loans continue to accrue interest,
which capitalizes once loans switch out of forbearance and back into a
repayment plan.80 The number of borrowers with loans in forbearance
has risen significantly in light of the relief that the CARES Act provides
for borrowers during the COVID-19 crisis, but data is not yet available on
how many borrowers have placed their loans in forbearance during this
time.81
73. See Iuliano, supra note 17; Jason Iuliano, Student Loans and Surmountable Access-
to-Justice Barriers, 68 FLA. L. REV. 377, 378, 380, 389 (2016) (emphasizing—in a more
recent study by the same author—that many student loan borrowers do not pursue dis-
charge in bankruptcy because they may not know about it as a potential option, they risk
opposition in court to do so, and they could wait for years in appeals of court decisions
before being granted relief).
74. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Katie Brazis, What Is Student Loan Forbearance and Should You Con-
sider It?, COLL. INV’R (Mar. 20, 2020), https://thecollegeinvestor.com/20236/student-loan-
forbearance/ [https://perma.cc/5CWF-6UYD].
77. Id. (noting that general forbearance may be applied for in the event that the bor-





81. Coronavirus and Forbearance Info for Students, Borrowers, and Parents, FED. STU-
DENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/announcements-events/coronavirus [https://perma.cc/
6RWV-795W]. That said, researchers have uncovered data from private and FFELP
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On the other hand, before COVID-19, 3.6 million borrowers nation-
wide had over $128 billion in student loans in deferment.82 Deferment
allows borrowers to delay their loans without interest.83 There are differ-
ent types of deferment, including, but not limited to, education, active
military duty, unemployment, and cancer treatment.84 It is important to
note that there is a distinction between deferment on federal student
loans and deferment on private loans.85 When a private lender offers
deferment, they are actually offering forbearance because the loan still
accrues interest during the time the borrower’s loan is in deferment.86
Essentially, there is no such thing as a true “deferment” in the context of
private student loans; this matters for the SLABS sector, given that pri-
vate loans can be securitized and offered to SLABS investors. However,
the vast majority of borrowers in deferment are utilizing the classifica-
tion’s full protection from interest accrual on their federal student loans,
which is unavailable to private student loan borrowers.
2. Default: The “End of the Road”
When a borrower is unable to pay back her student loans, default is the
borrower’s last stop—short of bankruptcy. As of 2019, 5.5 million Ameri-
cans have defaulted on over $119.8 billion in student loan debt.87 Accord-
ing to the Federal Reserve, 10.8% of all student loans are either
delinquent or in default. Approximately 3.1% of student loans are con-
sidered delinquent, and the remaining 7.7% are in default.88
Delinquency and default are generally grouped together because the
latter is a consequence of the former. An account is considered “delin-
quent” as soon as a borrower misses a payment on the borrower’s student
loans.89 It is easy for a borrower to miss a payment, but it is often the case
that the borrower can rectify the issue and catch up on payments. Default
occurs when an account is delinquent for an extended period of time,
usually starting when the borrower has been delinquent on payments for
loans—which back SLABS issues—that have entered forbearance in the last five months.
Ben Kaufman, Amid the Coronavirus, Struggling Private Student Loan Borrowers Pause
Payments Without a Path to Get on Track, STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. (June 8,
2020), https://protectborrowers.org/slabs/ [https://perma.cc/8TYU-XTPE ] (illustrating the
dramatic increases in borrowers whose loans back SLABS entering forbearance and de-
fault since January 2020).
82. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11.
83. See, e.g., Robert Farrington, The Complete and Easy Guide to Student Loan Defer-
ment, COLL. INV’R (June 8, 2020), https://thecollegeinvestor.com/9949/the-complete-guide-
to-student-loan-deferments/ [https://perma.cc/6SFV-ZMKG].
84. See, e.g., Ryan Lane, Deferment vs. Forbearance: Which Is Right for Your Student
Loans?, NERDWALLET (July 14, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/student-
loans/student-loan-deferment-forbearance/ [https://perma.cc/SFL7-5GDR].
85. See, e.g., Brazis, supra note 76.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Kali Hawlk, What’s the Difference Between Student Loan Delinquency
and Default?, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Aug. 8, 2019), https://studentloanhero.com/featured/
difference-between-student-loan-default-delinquency/ [https://perma.cc/EPT6-NXG6].
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270 days. And default is no small problem. In 2017 alone, well before the
onset of COVID-19, over one million borrowers defaulted on nearly $20
billion worth of student loan debt.90
It is important to acknowledge that default does not affect all student
loan borrowers equally. Approximately 60% of all students need to bor-
row student loans to attend a four-year public college.91 When looking at
the student loan debt burdens on individual races, however, the differ-
ences become stark. Though 59.9% of White students need to borrow
student loans to attend a university, a staggering 86.8% of Black students
need to do the same.92 Likewise, default differentially affects borrowers
based on race. While only 4% of White borrowers default on their stu-
dent loans, Latino borrowers are over two times (8.6%) more likely to
default than their White peers.93 Even more severely, 20.6% of Black
borrowers default on their student loans—over five times the rate at
which White borrowers default.94
These glaring differences illustrate how paying for higher education is
inherently unequal and demands greater scholarly attention than can be
given within the scope of this Article. However, it is worthwhile to con-
sider one potential explanation as to why Latino and Black borrowers
default at higher rates than their White counterparts: Latino and Black
borrowers tend to incur substantially more student loan debt when com-
pared to other racial or ethnic groups.95 The descriptive fact that Black
and Latino borrowers carry greater student loan debt loads augments the
90. See Ben Miller, Who Are Student Loan Defaulters?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/
2017/12/14/444011/student-loan-defaulters/ [https://perma.cc/YUW4-59K8] (citing Default
Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/default
[https://perma.cc/984T-W2P8]); see also Matthew Bruckner, Brook Gotberg, Dalié
Jimeénez & Chrystin Ondersma, A No-Contest Discharge for Uncollectible Student Loans,
91 U. COLO. L. REV. 183, 189 n.25 (2020) (“This [estimate] understates the magnitude of
the problem, as student loans are only in default after 270–360 days of non-payment, sug-
gesting that many more borrowers are seriously behind on their payments, although not
yet in default. Further this figure does not include loans in forbearance. Even with these
depressed figures, the student loan default rate is higher than the default rate for auto
loans, of which only 8.5 percent are at least thirty days delinquent.”).
91. See, e.g., Rebecca Safier, Study: Student Loans Weigh the Heaviest on Black and




93. Note that 8.6% of Latino borrowers default on their student loans. See e.g., Chris
Arnold, Student Loans a Lot Like the Subprime Mortgage Debacle, Watchdog Says, NPR
(Dec. 9, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/09/785527874/student-loans-a-lot-like-
the-subprime-mortgage-debacle-watchdog-says [https://perma.cc/JD6T-8JJW].
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Richard Pallardy, Racial Disparities in Student Loan Debt, SAVING FOR
COLL. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/racial-disparities-in-stu
dent-loan-debt [https://perma.cc/L785-EXDS]; see also Safier, supra note 91; Michal Grin-
stein-Weiss, Dana C. Perantie, Samuel H. Taylor, Shenyang Guo & Ramesh Raghavan,
Racial Disparities in Education Debt Burden Among Low- and Moderate-Income House-
holds, 65 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 166, 166 (2016); Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing Li,
Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More Than Triples After Graduation, BROOK-
INGS (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/black-white-disparity-in-student-
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likelihood of default for these borrowers, narrowing their options when
they are unable to make monthly payments on their loans. Ultimately, in
default, borrowers are faced with two options, broadly speaking: to re-
pay—either by paying their debt in full or by rehabilitating their loans by
entering into a repayment plan—or to stop repaying their loans. Typi-
cally, this is not much of a choice at all, and those who are in default must
seek other remedies for their problem.
III. SQUARING STUDENT LOANS WITH
BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES
A. HOW BANKRUPTCY LAW OPERATES IN THE CONTEXT
OF STUDENT LOANS
In the 120 years since the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, con-
sumer bankruptcy in the United States has occupied a relatively bor-
rower-friendly position, offering borrowers a discharge of their debts in
exchange for the surrender of non-exempt assets.96 However, the pros-
pect of a creditor reaching a borrower’s non-exempt assets is dubious be-
cause non-exempt assets are non-existent in the vast majority of
consumer bankruptcy cases. Thus, most borrowers give up little to noth-
ing to be released from their debt obligations under Chapter 7 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code and may reap the benefit of “their future earnings free
from the claims of [former] creditors.”97 The pro-borrower posture taken
in bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
is tailormade for borrowers in times like these.98 When a crisis occurs, or
all else fails and a borrower is unable to meet the borrower’s debt repay-
ment obligations, the borrower may consider filing for bankruptcy to re-
lieve the borrower’s debt obligation by going through a Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding.99
Overall, bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 7 are most common
for individuals; Chapters 11, 12, and 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are
generally reserved for different circumstances, including organizational
loan-debt-more-than-triples-after-graduation/ [https://perma.cc/LCF6-LNZA]; Houle,
supra note 29, at 60.
96. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Options in Consumer Bankruptcy: An American Perspec-
tive, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 155 (1999); see also Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991).
97. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE 264, 267 (Charles
E.F. Rickett & Thomas G.W. Telfer eds., 2003).
98. See Edward R. Morrison & Andrea C. Saavedra, Bankruptcy’s Role in the
COVID-19 Crisis 3–4 (Columbia L. & Econ. Working Paper, No. 624, 2020), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567127&dgcid=EJournal_htmlemail_law:eco-
nomics:ejournal_abstractlink [https://perma.cc/D9JS-5M44] (focusing on Chapter 11
proceedings, but noting that bankruptcy law—including Chapter 7—could mitigate the fi-
nancial fallout from COVID-19).
99. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1328(b) (providing for discharge of debts
under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, respectively).
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bankruptcy filings.100 As alluded to above, during a Chapter 7 proceed-
ing, the court liquidates all of the debtor’s non-exempt assets and prop-
erty and uses the proceeds of this liquidation to pay creditors.101 Once
those funds have been depleted, the remaining unpaid debts—including
mortgages and credit card debt—are then discharged by the bankruptcy
court.102 However, there are certain exceptions in which the court will
not grant the debtor a discharge in a Chapter 7 proceeding.103 These ex-
ceptions include a borrower’s obligations to pay child support, debt aris-
ing from the debtor’s willful and malicious infliction of injury, or
fraudulently incurred debt.104 Likewise, student loan debt will not be dis-
charged by a bankruptcy court unless the borrower can show that repay-
ment of the student loan debt obligation would impose an “undue
hardship” on the borrower.105 At first blush, the “undue hardship” bar
would seem to be a fairly easy bar for a borrower to surmount, clearing a
path to student loan discharge via bankruptcy. However, in practice, the
task of meeting this standard is anything but easy, making student loan
discharge through bankruptcy proceedings practically unavailable to
borrowers.
1. When Does an “Undue Hardship” Exist?
The requirements for individuals seeking to discharge student loan
debt via bankruptcy are mostly the same as those filing to discharge other
types of debt; however, there are a few notable deviations. First, in addi-
tion to filing for bankruptcy, borrowers seeking to discharge student
loans in bankruptcy proceedings may also be required to file an adversary
proceeding.106 An adversary proceeding is necessary when there is a fun-
damental disagreement between a borrower and the borrower’s credi-
tor—typically having to do with the dischargeability of a debt.107 The
adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court is essentially the equivalent of
100. The American Bankruptcy Institute reports that there was a total of 757,497 bank-
ruptcy filings in 2019 and that nearly 62%—or 467,728—of these were Chapter 7 filings.
Newsroom: Statistics from Epiq, December 2019 Bankruptcy Statistics–State and District,
AM. BANKR. INST., https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics [https://perma.cc/
SH4N-HF8M]. It should be noted that these statistics do not indicate whether the Chapter
7 cases were converted from cases arising in another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (requiring that a Chapter 7 trustee shall “collect and
reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves”).
102. Id. We note, here, that the bankruptcy court discharges the in personam liability of
the borrower and not the in rem liability of the borrower in the example of mortgage debt
discharged by the bankruptcy court.
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
104. Id. §§ 523(a)(4)–(6).
105. See id. § 523(a)(8).
106. For an example of how an adversary proceeding is filed, see FAQs: What Is an
Adversary Proceeding and How Do I File a Complaint?, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR DIST. OR.,
https://www.orb.uscourts.gov/faq/what-adversary-proceeding-and-how-do-i-file-complaint
[https://perma.cc/AVE7-ZZ4B]. But see Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adver-
sary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 951 (2005) (arguing
that adversary proceedings are “a small (even trivial) part of the bankruptcy process”).
107. FAQs, supra note 106.
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a civil complaint.108 This requires a borrower to file a written complaint
outlining the circumstances of the borrower’s case.109 Second, to success-
fully discharge student loans via bankruptcy, the borrower must allege
and be able to demonstrate that the student loan debt would impose an
undue hardship on the borrower and the borrower’s dependents.110 In
discussing the undue hardship standard, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt—
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this para-
graph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor’s dependents, for—
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, in-
sured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental
unit or nonprofit institution; or
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educa-
tional benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education
loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual.111
While the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not define a clear test—in the sec-
tion of the code making student loans presumptively nondischargeable—
to determine whether an undue hardship exists,112 a majority of federal
bankruptcy courts have adopted the Brunner test to determine whether
or not such a hardship exists.113 Therefore, to succeed in discharging stu-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal:
Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 210 (2009).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
112. However, Congress does define “undue hardship” in another section of the code:
11 U.S.C. § 524(m)(1). See Bruckner, et al., supra note 90, at 194 n.48 (discussing this sec-
tion and noting that it deals with “reaffirmation of debts which states that ‘it shall be pre-
sumed that such agreement is an undue hardship on the debtor if the debtor’s monthly
income less the debtor’s monthly expenses . . . is less than the scheduled payments on the
reaffirmed debt’” (alteration in original)). By and large, bankruptcy courts have not read
§ 523(a)(8) and § 524(m) together, adding to the confusion around the “undue hardship”
standard. See id.; Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy
Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
405, 510–14 (2005).
113. The Brunner test is dominant test and is the correct test to apply in all circuit
courts, aside from the Eighth and First Circuits, which use the “totality of the circum-
stances” test instead. See In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“An over-
whelming majority of circuits has now adopted the Second Circuit’s three-part Brunner
test.”); see also Bruckner, et al., supra note 90, at 195 n.49–50 (“Bankruptcy courts have
generally been forced to use the Brunner test because the test has been widely adopted by
the courts of appeals, thereby making it binding precedent that must be followed by bank-
ruptcy courts in the adopting circuits.”); Pardo & Lacey, supra note 112, at 488 n.348 (dis-
cussing the origin of the totality of the circumstances test); Steven Frederick Werth,
Student Loan Debt Dischargeability—Courts Discuss Limits of Brunner Test, BLOOMBERG
L. (Jan. 27, 2016, 8:18 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/student-loan-
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dent loans via bankruptcy, a borrower must prove that the student loans
pose an undue hardship by satisfying the Brunner test requirements, but
this is easier said than done.114
2. The Brunner Test
In 1985, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York handed down its decision in the matter of Brunner v. New
York State Higher Education Services Corporation, which would become
the single most influential decision in the context of student loan dis-
chargeability.115 Precipitating the case, Marie Brunner waited less than
one year after graduating from college before filing for bankruptcy in an
attempt to discharge her student loans.116 At the time of the court’s deci-
sion, there was no real standard for student loan discharge under Chapter
7 bankruptcy proceedings, so the federal bankruptcy court devised a test
based on criteria other courts used to evaluate similar cases.117
The first prong of the test that the court created for whether a bor-
rower could have her student loans discharged through a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, henceforth known as the Brunner test, requires the borrower to
show that she is unable to simultaneously make payments on her student
loans and achieve the “minimal standard of living” for herself and, if ap-
plicable, any of her dependents.118 In other words, this first prong of the
Brunner test, in which borrowers must establish that repaying student
loans creates an undue hardship, places the burden on borrowers to
demonstrate that, “given [their] current income and expenses, the neces-
sity of making the monthly loan payment will cause [their] standard of
living to fall below a ‘minimal’ level.”119
In Brunner, the borrower was unable to secure employment following
her graduation and decided to file for bankruptcy after just eleven
months.120 If a borrower has no source of income, it is clear that the bor-
rower would be unable to achieve the “minimal standard of living” and
make the required monthly payments on the borrower’s student loans.121
In fact, showing that the borrower has no income demonstrates that the
borrower has no realistic ability to either meet loan repayment obliga-
tions or achieve a minimal standard of living.122 The court opined that “it
is not unreasonable to hold that committing the [borrower] to a life of
debt-dischargeability-courts-discuss-limits-of-brunner-test [https://perma.cc/8ED9-
WGXG].
114. See, e.g., Zack Friedman, Can You Discharge Your Student Loans in Bankruptcy?,
FORBES (Jan. 9, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/01/09/stu
dent-loans-bankruptcy-discharge/#53abcee06d56 [https://perma.cc/FA29-W74P].
115. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
116. See id. at 753.
117. Id. at 753, 756.
118. Id. at 754.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 753, 757.
121. Id. at 757.
122. Id.
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poverty for the term of the loan—generally ten years—imposes ‘undue’
hardship.”123 However, the issue with this prong alone—and the reason-
ing behind the introduction of the second prong of the Brunner test—
rests with the court’s opposition to speculating about what the borrower’s
future financial state will be.124
The second prong of the Brunner test turns on whether the borrower’s
hardship is likely to persist for “a significant portion of the repayment
period of the [student] loan.”125 This second prong works as an extension
of the first prong because at the time the Brunner decision was rendered,
a majority of courts required “more than a showing on the basis of cur-
rent finances.”126 In a decision a few years prior to Brunner, another
judge in the same bankruptcy court delivered an opinion that clarified
dischargeability standards, stating that “dischargeability of student loans
should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply a present
inability to fulfill financial commitment.”127 This language has been con-
strued to require that borrowers show “unique” or “exceptional” circum-
stances before their student loans can be discharged via bankruptcy.128
Thus, this is the element of the Brunner test which places a very high—if
not functionally impossible—bar for borrowers to clear in order to have
their student loans discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.129
In Marie Brunner’s case, the bankruptcy court determined that nothing
in the record supported a finding that it was likely that she would con-
tinue to be unemployed for a significant period of the loan.130 In addition,
the court found that nothing in the record alleged that the borrower was
123. Due to the fact that the borrower was unemployed, and her only source of income
was government assistance, it is clear that this prong would be satisfied. See id. at 752, 757.
124. Id. at 754–55.
125. Id. at 755.
126. Id. (discussing that predicting the future is uneasy based on an “extrapolation of
present needs”).
127. See Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (discussing that the borrower is required to demonstrate that the current inability to
pay will extend for a significant portion of the repayment period of the loan).
128. Circumstances that are considered “unique” or “exceptional” include illness, a
lack of usable job skills, or the existence of a large number of dependents. See, e.g., In re
Norman, 25 B.R. 545, 549–50 (Bankr. S.D. Cal 1982); Seibert v. U.S. Gov’t Dep’t of Health
Educ. & Welfare (In re Siebert), 10 B.R. 704, 705 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); Clay v.
Westmar Coll. (In re Clay), 12 B.R. 251, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981).
129. While data on student loan discharge in bankruptcy proceedings is not widely
available or current, the number of borrowers who have been able to meet this bar is
vanishingly small:
Only 29 of 72,000 student loan borrowers with active bankruptcy filings in
2008 succeeded in getting a full or partial discharge of their student
loans . . . . That’s 0.04%, or odds of about 1 in 2,500. You’re more likely to
die of a heart attack or of cancer than to get your student loans discharged in
bankruptcy.
Mark Kantrowitz, How to Discharge Your Student Loans in Bankruptcy, SAVING FOR
COLL. (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/how-to-discharge-your-stu
dent-loans-in-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/8SXH-AAVT]. But see Iuliano, supra note 73
(suggesting that this statistic appears dismal precisely because most borrowers do not seek
discharge in bankruptcy proceedings and that they would have success of getting at least
partial relief if they did).
130. See Brunner, 46 B.R. at 758.
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faced with the aforementioned unique or exceptional circumstances that
demonstrated “a total incapacity now and in the future to pay [her] debts
for reasons not within [her] control.”131
The third and final prong of the Brunner test asks if the borrower made
“good faith efforts” to repay the borrower’s student loans.132 This re-
quirement addresses the court’s concern about unscrupulous borrowers—
of which there are likely very few133—using the bankruptcy process to
discharge all of their debt obligations by virtue of a singular process that
relies on their student loan debt-to-income ratios. For example, the court
in Brunner stated its intention—and that of lawmakers—“to forestall stu-
dents, who frequently have a large excess of liabilities over assets solely
because of their student loans, from abusing the bankruptcy system to
shed [their] loans.”134 Perhaps this requirement is owing to the particular
circumstances of the case before the court; in Brunner, the court was
faced with a borrower who demonstrated that she made “virtually no at-
tempt to repay.”135 In addition, the court highlighted that the borrower
did not seek any alternative remedies, such as deferment, before request-
ing a discharge via bankruptcy.136 Thus, perhaps rightly so, the court
seemed to make an example of Marie Brunner by implementing the good
faith prong of its test for undue hardship.137 Problematically, scholars
have observed that this test is inconsistently applied and used in myriad
ways to prevent other borrowers—whose cases were more deserving of
discharge—from realizing debt relief via bankruptcy proceedings.138
B. THE PRACTICAL PROHIBITION AGAINST STUDENT LOAN
DISCHARGE VIA BANKRUPTCY
Ostensibly, the Brunner test created a flexible standard that provided a
mechanism for borrowers to discharge their student loans in bankruptcy
proceedings.139 Its original intention may have been pure in that the test
131. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Rappaport, 16. B.R. 615, 617 (Bankr. D.
N.J. 1981)).
132. Id. at 755.
133. The myth of the unscrupulous borrower is unsubstantiated. See, e.g., Pardo, supra
note 17, at 2143.
134. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
135. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 758.
136. Id. But some courts have held that—for purposes of meeting the good faith re-
quirement—it would be inappropriate to withhold discharge from a borrower based on her
unwillingness to enter into an income-driven repayment plan instead of bankruptcy. See,
e.g., Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2013).
137. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 758.
138. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 110, at 197 (noting that the Brunner test has given
bankruptcy courts “free rein to infuse subjectivity into what should be a straightforward
financial calculation”); see also Taylor & Sheffner, supra note 17, at 332 (concluding that
bankruptcy courts’ use of the Brunner test “allow[s] for judicial subjectivities to influence
outcomes”); Bruckner et al., supra note 90, at 185–86 (“Keldric Dante Mosley was home-
less and surviving on food stamps and disability benefits from the United States Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs when he asked the bankruptcy court to relieve him of his $45,00
student loan burden.”).
139. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 758.
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was implemented to avoid abuse of the bankruptcy system by student-
borrowers.140 However, in reality, the Brunner test has often produced
harsh results, leading to its criticism from various contemporary
sources.141 Although some borrowers were still able to satisfy Brunner’s
strict test and have their student loans discharged in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the practical prohibition against student loan discharge via bank-
ruptcy was seemingly solidified after 2005.142
If there was any question about the dischargeability of student loan
debt, it was answered in the negative when Congress passed the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA).143
BAPCPA was enacted to stop debtors from abusing the Bankruptcy Code
more broadly, but in doing so, it explicitly exempted both private and
federal student loans from being dischargeable in bankruptcy.144 As with
the Brunner court’s reasoning, the rationale for the Act was to prevent
borrowers, including student loan borrowers, from exploiting and abusing
existing bankruptcy laws for their own pecuniary gain.145 But its provi-
sions, working in tandem with federal bankruptcy courts’ strict applica-
tion of the Brunner test, has all but foreclosed student loan
dischargeability to many non-exploitative student loan borrowers who
might otherwise have benefitted from their student loans being dis-
charged in bankruptcy.146 Clearly, the costs outweigh the benefits of the
Brunner test, given its misapplications. And to the extent that the test is
chipped away or replaced altogether by subsequent bankruptcy court de-
cisions, a new test could emerge that would hopefully net student loan
borrowers with meaningful relief, even if it could bring an end to the
presumption that SLABS are a sure bet for investors.147
140. Id.
141. See John Patrick Hunt, Consent to Student Loan Bankruptcy Discharge, 95 IND.
L.J. 1137, 1170–71 (2020); Bruckner et al., supra note 90, at 233–48 (discussing various
reform proposals).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The 2005 amendment to this code section broadened the
kinds of federal and private student loans that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, absent
a finding of the borrower’s undue hardship. See also Friedman, supra note 114.
143. Friedman, supra note 114.
144. Id.
145. Id. (discussing that a major concern was that allowing discharge of student loans
via bankruptcy would incentivize people borrowing massive sums of money to attend
school and then, shortly after receiving their degree, file for bankruptcy to have those loans
discharged).
146. Alexei Alexandrov & Dalié Jiménez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the Pri-
vate Student Loan Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 176 (2017) (exploring the effect
of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments on the private student loan market and suggesting
that “bankruptcy reform failed miserably at helping students”).
147. “In Brunner evaluations, courts tend to disagree on what constitutes a ‘minimal
standard of living.’ . . . Courts also vary substantially in determining what evidence debtors
are required to show to establish that their situation will persist. . . . However, although
scholars have advocated for judicial uniformity for over a decade, no such uniformity has
emerged.” Bruckner et al., supra note 94, at 196, 241–42.
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1. The First Real Crack in the Brunner Test’s Armor
Three recent cases decided in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York, as well as by two separate three-judge
panels of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the
Tenth Circuit, directly confront the legacy of the Brunner test and cast
doubt on its near-total prohibition of the discharge of student loan debt
in bankruptcy proceedings. We examine this emerging but swift change in
bankruptcy jurisprudence through the illustrative case of Rosenberg v.
New York State Higher Education Services Corp.148
Like many students, Kevin Rosenberg began borrowing money for his
educational expenses during his undergraduate education from 1993 to
1996.149 Subsequently, he enlisted in the Navy, where he was on active
duty for the next five years between 1996 and 2001.150 After completing
his military service, Rosenberg attended law school from 2001 through
2004.151 After graduating, his student loan balance, including both under-
graduate and graduate school debt, was $116,464.75.152 In June 2018, al-
most twenty-five years after taking out his first student loan, Rosenberg
filed for bankruptcy.153 At the time that his case was heard by a federal
bankruptcy court, Rosenberg owed $221,385.49 in student loan debt,
which was accruing interest at a rate of 3.38% per annum.154
On January 7, 2020, Rosenberg emerged victorious after Chief U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New York, Cecelia Morris,
declared that his substantial student loans were dischargeable in the
bankruptcy proceeding. Interestingly, Chief Judge Morris rendered her
decision using the Brunner test.155 Chief Judge Morris criticized her peers
in their harsh applications of the Brunner test, stating that “[o]ver the
past 32 years, many cases have pinned on Brunner punitive standards that
are not contained therein.”156 In her opinion, Chief Judge Morris contin-
ued to say that in the three decades since the Brunner decision was ren-
dered, the dictum in the cases using the Brunner test have been “applied
and reapplied so frequently in the context of Brunner that they have sub-
sumed the actual language of the Brunner test.”157 This speaks to the
reality that the Brunner test has taken on a life of its own, which the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York sought to alter
in Rosenberg, overturning aspects of its earlier precedent in Brunner.
148. Rosenberg v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Rosenberg), 610 B.R.







155. Id. at 456.
156. Id. at 458–59.
157. Id. at 459.
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2. Application of the Brunner Test in Rosenberg v. New York State
Higher Education Services Corp.
When evaluating the first prong of the Brunner test, the court must
determine whether borrowers cannot maintain, based on current income
and expense, a “minimal” standard of living for themselves and their de-
pendents if they are forced to repay their loans.158 At the time of the
filing, Rosenberg’s income was limited to $2,456.24 per month, which
could not cover his $4,005.00 in monthly expenses.159 This meant that Ro-
senberg had a negative net income of over $1,500 when he filed for bank-
ruptcy.160 These facts were sufficient to prove that Rosenberg was, based
on his current income, unable to immediately pay back his student loan in
full.161 The court used the “pay in full” metric because the borrower was
in default at the time of the proceeding and thus was not enrolled or
eligible for any kind of repayment plan.162 Since Rosenberg had a nega-
tive income each month and no present ability to repay his student loans,
the court found that he successfully satisfied the first prong of the Brun-
ner test.163
Next, the court turned to a discussion of whether additional circum-
stances existed that indicated Rosenberg’s state of affairs was likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of his student
loans.164 The court noted that the Brunner test does not require the court
to make a determination that the petitioner’s state of affairs will persist
forever, nor does it require a determination of whether the borrower’s
state of affairs was created by “choice.”165 In this case, Rosenberg’s re-
payment period had already ended, and he was in default.166 As a result,
at the time of filing for bankruptcy, Rosenberg was required to pay the
$221,385.49 in full.167 The court found that it was obvious that this state of
affairs would persist for the remainder of the repayment period because
the repayment period had already ended, and the total amount of the
loan was due.168 In conclusion, the court found that Rosenberg success-
fully satisfied the second prong of the Brunner test.169
158. Id.
159. Id. at 460.
160. Id. (noting that Rosenberg’s net income at the time of filing was –$1,548.74).
161. Id.
162. For a borrower to become eligible for a monthly repayment plan, he would first
need to agree “to make nine voluntary, reasonable and affordable monthly payments
within 20 days of the due date, and make all nine payments during a period of 10 consecu-
tive months.” See id. (noting that it would have been impractical to discuss a rehabilitation
option in this case, since Rosenberg already had a negative income each month notwith-
standing an effort to rehabilitate his student loans).
163. Id. at 460–61.
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In examining the last prong of the test, the court must determine
whether or not the borrower has made good faith efforts to repay the
loan.170 In evaluating this prong, the court can only look to borrowers’
past behavior in their effort to repay their student loans.171 As of 2018,
thirteen years after his student loan payments first became due, Rosen-
berg had only missed sixteen payments.172 However, it is important to
note that Rosenberg’s student loan was in deferment or forbearance for
the ten-year period after they became due, from about April 2005
through April 2015.173 As discussed in earlier sections of this Article,
deferment and forbearance stall the borrower from making any pay-
ments.174 Thus, as of 2015—when the forbearance or deference period
ended—Rosenberg was completely current on his student loan debt, and
no payments were due on his loans.175
From April 2015 through January 2018, Rosenberg entered into a series
of repayment plans in addition to a forbearance period from April 2016
through October 2016.176 Over “the 26 months that [he] was responsible
for making payments” on his outstanding student loan, Rosenberg “made
10 payments, in varying amounts.”177 In fact, the court highlighted that
Rosenberg made payments whenever he could, including the period
when his account was in forbearance, meaning that he made payments
even though no payments were due at that time.178 In January 2018, Ro-
senberg entered default on his outstanding student loan.179 Ultimately,
the court calculated the rate of payment, taking into consideration the
months in which payments were due compared with how many payments
were actually made.180 Finding that a 40% payment rate over a thirteen-
year period was a satisfactory showing of Rosenberg’s good faith effort to
repay his student loan, the court found that the third and final prong of
the Brunner test was satisfied.181
Concluding that all of the elements of the Brunner test were met, the
court found that Rosenberg successfully satisfied the undue hardship
standard.182 As a result, the court ordered that all of Rosenberg’s student
170. Id.
171. Id. (noting that it is “inappropriate” for the court to consider the borrower’s rea-
sons for filing for bankruptcy, how much debt the borrower has, or if the borrower rejected
any options for repayment).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 462.
174. See supra Section I.C.1.





180. Id. (noting that ten payments over twenty-six months where Rosenberg was re-
quired to make a payment equals “approximately a 40% rate of payment over a thirteen-
year period”).
181. Id. (discussing how Rosenberg “did not sit back for 20 years but made a good faith
effort to repay his [s]tudent [l]oan”).
182. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
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loan debt be discharged on the grounds that it imposed an undue hard-
ship on him.183
While it bears mentioning that the case has been appealed, the cry of
scholars and borrowers alike for a turn away from both the strictures—
and vagaries—of the Brunner test, which has resulted in more harm than
good, make the Rosenberg case the best shot at overturning the Brunner
decision and replacing it with a test that more closely aligns with bor-
rower-friendly principles in consumer bankruptcy proceedings.184 Even if
the bankruptcy courts are slow to discard the Brunner test require-
ments—or the test’s reinterpretation under Rosenberg—the Rosenberg
decision could yield changes in bankruptcy courts. Borrowers have rarely
sought to have their loans discharged in bankruptcy because they either
were unaware that they could do so or thought they were unlikely to be
granted relief if they did. The significant media attention that the Rosen-
berg decision has received undoubtedly changes the informational asym-
metry confronting borrowers who find themselves unable to make their
student loan payments.185 Armed with this information and emboldened
by the favorable decision rendered in Rosenberg, many more borrowers
may now seek to have their student loans discharged in bankruptcy. And
many federal courts may agree with the Rosenberg court’s application of
the undue hardship test. Indeed, at the time of this Article’s publication,
at least two federal circuit courts of appeal have determined, like the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York did in reexam-
ining its Brunner holding in Rosenberg, that student loans are indeed dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy proceedings.186 That these cases were decided
in the borrowers’ favor, not just in bankruptcy court but in two federal
183. Rosenberg, 610 B.R. at 462.
184. Rosenberg v. NY State Higher Education Services Corporation et A Bankruptcy
Court Docket Sheet, DOCKETBIRD, https://www.docketbird.com/court-cases/Rosenberg-v-
NY-State-Higher-Education-Services-Corportion-et-A/nysb-4:2018-ap-09023 [https://
perma.cc/XMK4-9QRM].
185. See Adam S. Minsky, A Judge Just Wiped out This Man’s $221,000 in Student Debt,
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2020, 11:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamminsky/2020/01/22/a-
judge-just-wiped-out-this-mans-221000-in-student-debt/#53549ccc3782 [https://perma.cc/
98T3-47VT]; Steven Chung, An Interview With Kevin Rosenberg Where He Explains How
He Successfully Discharged His Student Loans in Bankruptcy Court, ABOVE L. (Jan. 15,
2020, 10:32 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/an-interview-with-kevin-rosenberg-
where-he-explains-how-he-successfully-discharged-his-student-loans-in-bankruptcy-court/
[https://perma.cc/SAX7-8NWP]; Samantha Fields, Judge Rejects “Myths” That It’s Impossi-
ble to Get Rid of Student Loans in Bankruptcy, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 15, 2020), https://
www.marketplace.org/2020/01/15/judge-rejects-myths-that-its-impossible-to-get-rid-of-stu
dent-loans-in-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/X6A6-Y6BX]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Law
Grad Wins Discharge of His Student Debt in Opinion Criticizing ‘Punitive Standards’, ABA
J. (Jan. 9, 2020, 10:25 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law-grad-wins-dis
charge-of-his-student-debt-in-opinion-criticizing-punitive-standards [https://perma.cc/
Y3UL-XPGC].
186. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Navient Sols., 973 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2020) (dealing with a
married couple who entered a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing to discharge their combined
student loan debt among other debt); Crocker v. Navient Solutions, 941 F.3d 206 (5th Cir.
2019) (resolving two individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings in different jurisdictions and
discharging the borrowers’ private student loans).
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courts of appeals, signals a marked shift in bankruptcy jurisprudence in a
very short time.187
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, unemployment rates have
dramatically increased and available jobs have become increasingly con-
tingent and precarious, while wages have stagnated and may remain stag-
nant for many months to come.188 Thus, it is entirely foreseeable that
many student loan borrowers’ expenses will outstrip their earnings. Re-
gardless of how long this state of affairs lasts, this situation will likely
result in default for a significant proportion of borrowers, many of whom
will have made good faith efforts to repay their loans until March 2020.
These borrowers will find themselves in circumstances that are similar, if
not functionally identical, to that of Kevin Rosenberg. Thus, the spate of
cases in which federal courts have concluded that student loans are dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy proceedings—in the last year alone—not only
impacts borrowers seeking to discharge their loans in bankruptcy but also
impacts the economy at large through the SLABS market.
IV. STUDENT LOAN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
A. SLABS: A FOUNDATION IN MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
In the wake of the 2008 recession, experts were nearly unanimous in
placing the blame of the economic downturn on lenders who issued sub-
prime mortgages and the subsequent investment in residential mortgage-
backed securities.189 Residential mortgage-backed securities—or, more
generally, asset-backed securities—are investments that make money
based on the revenue received from some underlying asset, and that un-
187. See Charles M. Tatelbaum, Christina V. Paradowski & Brittany L. Hynes, A
Changing Tide in the Bankruptcy Discharge of Certain Student Loan Debt, LAW.COM (Sept.
29, 2020, 10:19 AM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2020/09/29/a-changing-tide-
in-the-bankruptcy-discharge-of-certain-student-loan-debt/ [https://perma.cc/U8HX-9R2F];
Rebecca Safier, Student Loan Bankruptcy Discharge Ruling May Signal Big Boon to Bor-
rowers, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Sept. 9, 2020), https://studentloanhero.com/featured/stu
dent-loan-bankruptcy-discharge-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/4DHE-93W4].
188. See, e.g., Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment Rose Higher in Three Months of
COVID-19 Than It Did in Two Years of the Great Recession, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-
three-months-of-covid-19-than-it-did-in-two-years-of-the-great-recession/ [https://
perma.cc/Q6GW-9L4X]; Mary Baker, 9 Future of Work Trends Post-COVID-19, GART-
NER (June 8, 2020), https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/9-future-of-work-trends-
post-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/2LBX-KP8R] (noting that “32% of organizations are re-
placing full-time employees with contingent workers as a cost-saving measure”); Worker
Exposure Risk to COVID-19, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://
www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3993.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CQZ-J89W] (listing a broad
set of employment sectors as carrying at least medium risk of employees within those sec-
tors contracting COVID-19); Karen Ho, The COVID-19 Pandemic Will Be a Disaster for
Wages, Even Once We All Go Back to Work, QUARTZ (May 15, 2020), https://qz.com/
1856358/the-covid-19-pandemic-will-be-a-disaster-for-us-wages/ [https://perma.cc/ZF9J-
VU3C].
189. See, e.g., Eric Rauchway, The 2008 Crash: What Happened to All That Money?,
HISTORY (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/2008-financial-crisis-causes [https://
perma.cc/Y8WD-NEGY].
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derlying asset, typically, is debt.190 Aside from the obvious value to inves-
tors and potential investors, lenders are able to finance future loans with
the funds obtained through the sale of these securities.191 When a com-
pany creates a security, it will typically bundle a group of several thou-
sand debts and sell those debts to a financial firm.192 After the financial
firm acquires ownership of the debts, that firm will bundle thousands of
individual debts into one investment and sell shares for investors to
buy.193 These investments yield returns for investors when borrowers
make payments on their debts.194
As the title of this Article hints, there are many similarities between
the mortgages during the 2008 recession and the current status of student
loans. However, the two differ with respect to the debt obligations they
create. Lenders extend mortgages because they are secured by collateral;
typically, the real property itself is considered as collateral in the transac-
tion. As such, if a borrower defaults on the borrower’s mortgage, the
lender is then able to seize and sell the property to settle the borrower’s
debt obligation. Before the 2008 recession, many mortgage loans were
issued based on the expectation of future increases in value to the home
and, therefore, were originally undersecured, meaning that the loan to
value ratio was, in some cases, 100% at signing. However, when the hous-
ing bubble burst, the values of the homes dropped drastically, causing
loans that were initially oversecured to become undersecured and loans
that were originally undersecured to become dramatically more so, due to
the homes’ depreciation in value. When loans are undersecured and the
borrower defaults, lenders are in a first-loss position.
By way of an illustration, assume that a borrower went to a lender to
obtain a nonrecourse residential mortgage loan in 2006. The value of the
home was $500,000 at the time of the purchase. The borrower made a
20% down payment on the home, equal to $100,000. The borrower
looked to the lender to provide the additional $400,000 for the borrower
190. See, e.g., Eric Reed, Should You Invest in Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities?,
THESTREET (May 20, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/should-
you-invest-in-student-loan-asset-backed-securities-14142296 [https://perma.cc/DSG6-
NPS6] (noting that other revenue sources can be used, including an example of a “movie
studio [that] created bonds around film profits”).
191. For an in-depth analysis of how securitization funds new lending, and thus off-
loads risk borne by lenders, see Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ.
STATE L.J. 477, 477 (2020) [hereinafter Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts] (noting that
fintech credit firms routinely securitize loans that they originate, allowing them to access
capital markets and, in turn, “further the spread of borrower capital and credit risk”);
Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1617–18
(2019) [hereinafter Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt] (discussing how fintech lenders
are expanding their online lending activities to help student loan borrowers finance or
refinance student loan debt—which they then package as SLABS—and the stratification
issues that the use of education-based data creates, including discriminatory lending prac-
tices that harm minority groups); Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech
Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 783 (2018) (focusing on how fintech lenders securitize digi-
tal debt, among other things).
192. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, supra note 191, at 499.
193. Id at 502.
194. Id.
838 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
to purchase the home, needing to secure a mortgage loan for the same
amount. When evaluating whether to make a loan, the lender must ex-
amine the value of the asset that will become the collateral securing the
loan. Here, the collateral for the mortgage was the home itself. The vast
majority of lenders would have issued this loan because it was over-
secured by $100,000, providing the lender with an equity cushion equal to
the borrower’s downpayment. However, when home values started to fall
drastically in 2008, the value of the borrower’s home decreased to
$350,000. Now, instead of the bank having a $100,000 equity cushion, the
lender is faced with a $50,000 deficit on a now undersecured loan. Even-
tually, if the borrower defaulted, the borrower would forfeit the collateral
securing the mortgage loan—the borrower’s home—in exchange for be-
ing released from the mortgage obligation. Once the lender forecloses, it
owns the home but also suffers a $50,000 loss. Generally, businesses—
lending institutions included—are expected to incur some losses. How-
ever, lenders are unable to operate and unable to support the economy
when they consistently operate at a loss, as in the case of a multi-year
wave of mortgage loan defaults. The rate of default on residential mort-
gages reached its peak in 2010 when 23% of all homes in the United
States were worth less than their mortgages and slightly under half of
these homeowners defaulted on their mortgage loans.195
In the time leading up to the 2008 recession, lenders overextended
themselves by lending to subprime borrowers, or those who may have
difficulty in maintaining the repayment schedule, as reflected in their
credit scores.196 These mortgages were awarded so easily because the
lenders had no intention of keeping the loans.197 Instead, these lenders
became eager to sell off mortgages to banks, which would in turn bundle
these debts and market them as securities to hopeful investors.198 At the
time, mortgage-backed securities had been solid investments and had
yielded consistent returns on investment.199 However, risky mortgage
lending practices turned residential mortgage-backed securities into risky
investments when mortgage borrowers were ultimately unable to repay
their debts.200
195. See Weekly Economic & Financial Commentary, WELLS FARGO ECON. RSCH.
(Sept. 17, 2010), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/downloads/pdf/com/research/eco
nomic_commentary/efc09172010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KAJ-HXG5] (providing the statis-
tic for “underwater” home values); see also Jennifer Rudden, Mortgage Delinquency Rates
in the U.S. 2000–2018, STATISTA (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/205977/
us-federal-housing-administration-loans-since-1990/ [https://perma.cc/V2VB-LDS5] (listing
the residential mortgage default rate at 9.3% in 2010).
196. See Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Remarks at the Financial Services Round-
table Annual Housing Policy Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (May 21, 2004), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040521/default.htm [https://perma.cc/
7M8P-GR7U].
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The 2008 recession was particularly devastating because residential
mortgages were—and still are—the country’s largest source of consumer
debt, but student loan debt now follows closely behind. However, al-
though student loans can be issued to nearly anyone seeking to attend a
higher education institution and do not offer lenders the same kind of
collateral that mortgages do, student loans arguably carry less risk than
other loans because of the federal guarantee that many student loans en-
joy and because the enactment of BAPCPA effectively precluded student
loans from being discharged in bankruptcy.201 Thus, because student
loans carry relatively low risk for lenders relative to other forms of lend-
ing, the student loan lending industry—and, in the same vein, the student
loan asset-backed securities market—has grown considerably since its in-
ception, due in part to demand.202
B. A LOW-RISK INVESTMENT?
SLABS are a relatively new-fangled investment vehicle but their ori-
gins can be traced to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s adoption
of Rule 3a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.203 These rules al-
lowed security-issuing companies to avoid asset registration and regula-
tory oversight. Beginning in the early 1990s, student loan companies
started issuing securities and quickly turned a profit from them, leading
to their increased popularity over the last two decades.204 In fact, the de-
mand for these investments outweighs their supply.205 In total, approxi-
mately $600 billion worth of SLABS have been issued since their creation
in 1992.206 These SLABS have been issued to investors at rates that out-
pace other asset-backed securities sectors and include new private loans
made by Sallie Mae and newcomers like SoFi and Navient (a Sallie-Mae-
spinoff), as well as existing federal loans issued under the Federal Direct
Loan Program that have been privately refinanced and loans made under
the FFELP that continue to be securitized into asset-backed securities




203. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)–(b); 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7
(2020). Specifically, commodity pool operators, under Section 3(a), and companies en-
gaged in business other than investing, holding, or trading securities, under Sections
3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2), are exempt from the Act’s registration requirements. See Investment
Company Registration and Regulation Package, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 19,
2013), https://www.sec.gov/investment/fast-answers/divisionsinvestmentinvcoreg
121504htm.html#P91_16908 [https://perma.cc/JG32-472L].
204. See, e.g., Eli J. Campbell, Wall Street Has Been Gambling with Student Loan Debt
for Decades, COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/views/
2019/10/26/wall-street-has-been-gambling-student-loan-debt-decades-0 [https://perma.cc/
AU68-RJ3V].
205. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 190 (“Mike VanErdewyk, the founder and CEO of . . . a
private student loan solutions provider” stated that his firm has “a billion dollars more in
demand [for SLABS] than [his firm can] supply right now.”).
206. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 204.
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offerings, despite the discontinuation of FFELP in 2010.207
Like ordinary bonds, SLABS deliver investors scheduled coupon pay-
ments and are generally considered to be relatively safe investments for
two reasons.208 First, because SLABS diversify default risk for lenders
across many investors, lenders can issue more and larger loans, investors
can hold a diversifying investment vehicle, and lenders can create consis-
tent cash flow to repay investors through their scheduled coupon pay-
ments.209 The second reason only applies to some student loans marketed
as SLABS, but if the SLABS investor is not discerning, the investor may
think it applies to all loans in a SLABS class. The majority of student
loans—more than $1.4 trillion—are guaranteed by the federal govern-
ment—up to 97% of the principal on the loan plus interest payments—in
the event that the student loan borrower defaults.210 This guarantee en-
sures that most, if not all, of the underlying collateral will be returned to
the lender in the event of a borrower’s default.211 That said, private loans
do not come with the same guarantee, but these loans represent a small
proportion—around 10%—of the student loan sector.212 The underlying
presumption that student loans are federally guaranteed—because the
overwhelming majority of loans are federally guaranteed—gives rise to
the misconception that most loans included in SLABS come with federal
backing; however, the reality is that they do not. New privately issued
loans do not have federal backing, nor do loans issued by the federal
government through its Federal Direct Loan Program once they have
been consolidated with a private lender.213 In fact, Federal Direct Loans
207. Douglas Gimple, The Evolution of the Asset-Backed Securities Market, DIAMOND
HILL (Nov. 2018), https://www.diamond-hill.com/the-evolution-of-the-asset-backed-securi
ties-market/ [https://perma.cc/A6U6-ZNMT]; see Campbell, supra note 204.
208. See, e.g., S&P Municipal Bond Student Loan Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICES,
https://us.spindices.com/indices/fixed-income/sp-municipal-bond-student-loan-index?fb-
clid=IWAR0OLfGnwurmqlOcvre_kVsYjzD014nOUEViPoGD5Djyc2ohkZxETVc5ZXg
[https://perma.cc/484W-7XQY#overview] (noting the performance of the student loan sec-
tor in the S&P Municipal Bond Index).
209. See Du, supra note 12.
210. See Stephanie Lee & Max Egan, Student Loans and Student Loan Asset-Backed
Securities: A Primer, MONDAQ (June 23, 2009), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/Liti
gation-Mediation-Arbitration/81108/Student-Loans-And-Student-Loan-Asset-Backed-Se
curities-A-Primer [https://perma.cc/R9VC-PDSW].
211. Id. (noting that this guarantee protects the lender but not necessarily the SLABS
holder).
212. See id.; see also Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, supra note 191.
213. See, e.g., Dave Dahlen, Loan Consolidation: What’s the Big Deal?, MAYO FOUND.,
https://www.ohe.state.mn.us/pdf/loanConsolidation.pdf [https://perma.cc/EEX2-4DND].
That said, SLABS that include private loans and federally issued loans, have been consoli-
dated by private lenders, and carry a AAA rating have historically been eligible as Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) collateral—a distinct form of federal-back-
ing. TALF is a program instituted by the Federal Reserve to spur the issuance of asset-
backed securities in the wake of the 2008 recession and provides the issuer of asset-backed
security a five-year-or-fewer loan to leverage the issuance of more asset-backed securities.
See Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), FED. RSRV. (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/reform-talf.htm [https://perma.cc/5BB9-ZN4R];
see also BONNIE G. BUCHANAN, SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: HISTORY
AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 91 (2017). TALF support was renewed by the Federal
Reserve in March 2020, amidst COVID-19. Cheryl D. Barnes, Scott A. Cammarn, Michael
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issued by the federal government after 2010 are not eligible for securitiza-
tion and subsequent marketing as SLABS at all, provided that they are
not consolidated with a private lender.214 The only class of student loans
included in SLABS that retains the federal guarantee is the FFELP class
of loans, which leads to the assumption that SLABS consisting of FFELP
loans carry lower risk than SLABS backed by private loans.215
Even before the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the
most pressing issues—in general, in higher education, and as it relates to
the economy—is that students are increasingly burdened by the rising
cost of higher education.216 When students borrow larger amounts of
money to fund their attendance at a postsecondary education institution,
the amount of their student loan debt increases, and yet, the salaries they
can expect to earn in the workforce upon completing their studies remain
fairly stagnant.217 This presents a challenge to the value proposition of
higher education and distorts the relationship of student loan debt—as a
debt class—to the value of the underlying asset.218 In other words, when
post-graduate incomes remain stagnant and student loan debt continues
to grow, it creates a “bubble” that is waiting to burst.219
The entire SLABS market is premised on the fact that SLABS will
continue to produce steady returns for their investors, as they have for
many years. This expectation is owing, in part, to a misconception that the
loans comprising the SLABS are federally guaranteed and are ineligible
for discharge via normal bankruptcy procedures.220 But both of these as-
sumptions should be called into question. First, student loans have always
carried some risk of default, which—in the case of FFELP loans mar-
keted as SLABS—is mitigated by their federal guarantee. However, over
the last few months, to say nothing of the days and weeks ahead, the risk
incident to investing in SLABS has significantly increased. The same
S. Gambro, David S. Gingold & Kahn D. Hobbs, COVID-19 Update: Federal Reserve Is-
sues New TALF Term Sheet and Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L L. REV.
(May 15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/covid-19-update-federal-reserve-is-
sues-new-talf-term-sheet-and-responses-to [https://perma.cc/BJM3-66KJ]. As should be
made plain by the terms of the program, this program is distinguishable from federal-back-
ing of student loans.
214. See generally Should I Refinance My Federal Student Loan into a Private Student
Loan With a Lower Rate?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 8, 2017), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/should-i-refinance-my-federal-student-loan-into-a-pri
vate-student-loan-with-a-lower-rate-en-1687/ [https://perma.cc/Z9GG-BZUK].
215. Timothy Bernstein, The Trouble With FFELP ABS: An Explainer, NEW OAK,
https://newoak.com/trouble-ffelp-abs-explainer/ [https://perma.cc/9N23-YYYC]; see Camp-
bell, supra note 204 (“There are still roughly $280 billion of FFEL loans outstanding, and
the largest firms such as Navient and Nelnet still have FFEL loans in their portfolios and
have continued to issue FFEL-backed SLABS.”).
216. See supra Part I.
217. See Campbell, supra note 204.
218. Id. See generally Kate Sablosky Elengold, The Investment Imperative, 57 HOUS. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2019).
219. Id.; see Lee & Egan, supra note 210; Prentiss Cox, Judith Fox & Stacey Tutt, For-
gotten Borrowers: Protecting Private Student Loan Borrowers Through State Law, 11 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
220. See Campbell, supra note 204.
842 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
credit rating agencies that expected SLABS to outperform comparable
asset classes one year ago221 have now signaled enhanced risk in the sec-
tor by downgrading ratings for several billions of dollars of SLABS.222
Credit rating agencies now believe that increasing levels of forbearance
and default in the loans underlying SLABS impact the SLABS issuer’s
ability to pay principal to investors by previously-set final maturity
dates—this coming only a few months into the economic uncertainty
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.223 Although the risk of borrower
delinquency or default is nothing new,224 in light of present economic re-
alities, “the nation’s largest student loan servicers, including Navient . . .
have looked to avoid [default risk] either by . . . gaining approvals to
amend their bond maturity dates, or by borrowing money to repay [their
SLABS] investors themselves.”225 Loan servicers have even begun
purchasing loans to pay off bond notes.226 Thus, the sharp reversal by
credit rating agencies is warranted and highlights the fragility of the
SLABS market. But it also harkens back to the collapse of the mortgage-
backed securities market in 2008.
Like mortgages before the 2008 recession, “many of the student loans
backing [SLABS] have been given to borrowers with [little to] no assess-
ment” of the borrowers’ abilities to repay their loans.227 And in the case
of private loans, in particular, there are entire classes of SLABS backed
221. See, e.g., Selven C. Veeraragoo, Jinwen Chen & Joseph Grohotolski, Research An-
nouncement: Moody’s Refi SLABS Will Likely Outperform Comparable ABS Asset Clas-
ses, MOODY’S (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Refi-SLABS-
will-likely-outperform-comparable-ABS-asset-classes—PBS_1192557 [https://perma.cc/
FU4B-E9AR].
222. See, e.g., Jiaoren Wang & Jinwen Chen, Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades and
Places on Review for Downgrade Certain FFELP Student Loan ABS, MOODY’S (June 3,
2020), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-and-places-on-review-for-
downgrade-certain-FFELP—PR_425478 [https://perma.cc/Q8VY-W9TP] (discussing
Moody’s rationale for downgrading $11 billion worth of SLABS—representing about 13%
of the $99 billion worth of FFELP bonds that Moody’s rates).
223. See, e.g., Mark W. O’Neil & John Anglim, Effects of COVID-19 in U.S. Student
Loan ABS, S&P GLOB. RATINGS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/re
search/articles/200430-effects-of-covid-19-on-u-s-student-loan-abs-11453961 [https://
perma.cc/4M3C-UZ48]; see also Coronavirus Impact Increases Maturity Risk for FFELP
ABS, FITCH RATINGS (Mar. 26, 2020, 4:06 PM), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/
structured-finance/coronavirus-impact-increases-maturity-risk-for-ffelp-abs-26-03-2020
[https://perma.cc/4L46-8GER] (“Currently, approximately 31% of Fitch’s rated portfolio
by bond balance falls into [the FFELP] group.”).
224. As recently as one year ago, and well before the COVID-19 pandemic, projections
of delinquency rates alone “suggest that 40% of all borrowers are expected to miss pay-
ments by 2022.” See Stein & Duvall, supra note 14.
225. See, e.g., Wiltermuth, supra note 72. A recent class-action lawsuit also alleged that
Navient misled FFELP borrowers about their repayment options. See Corrado Rizzi, Class
Action Alleges Navient Misled Student Loan Borrowers About FFELP Repayment Options,
CLASSACTION.ORG, https://www.classaction.org/blog/class-action-alleges-navient-misled-
student-loan-borrowers-about-ffelp-repayment-options [https://perma.cc/7KKH-SSVH]
(last updated Oct. 5, 2017).
226. Wiltermuth, supra note 72.
227. Elena J. Despotopulos, The Securitization of Student Loans: How Investors Are
Making Money off Your Loans, NE. U. L. REV. F. (May 12, 2018), https://nulron-
lineforum.wordpress.com/2018/05/12/the-securitization-of-student-loans-how-investors-
are-making-money-off-your-loans/ [https://perma.cc/HF9J-KZE6].
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by loans that were issued to borrowers who were unlikely to repay them.
For example, SLM Private Education Student Loan 2009-CT Trust, a
SLABS product created from loans issued by Sallie Mae, consists of more
than 40,000 loans made to students attending unaccredited trade school
programs, such as truck-driving school, cosmetology school, and even
dog-walking school.228 Our mentioning the educational programs at-
tended by the borrowers whose loans backed the SLM Private Education
Loan Trust 2009-CT is not meant to disparage these borrowers. It is, how-
ever, meant to highlight the risk of default among borrowers of private
student loans. Some direct-to-consumer private loan programs, like the
programs these borrowers entered into, have suffered annual default
rates of more than 60% in some years, making them among the riskiest
loans to back a SLABS issue.229 Yet, when the SLM Private Education
Student Loan 2009-CT Trust was issued in 2009, Moody’s gave the
SLABS a rating of “Aaa,” the agency’s highest rating.230 This illustrative
example underscores the precariousness of the SLABS sector, which is
operating at heightened risk under the current market conditions.
Even with six months of student loan relief provided in the $2 trillion
package of the CARES Act, there is every reason to believe that skyrock-
eting unemployment will lead to dramatically increased student loan de-
fault rates when the relief ends on December 31, 2020.231 A spike in this
228. See SLM Private Education Loan Trust 2009-CT: Monthly Servicing Report,
NAVIENT, https://navient.com/assets/about/investors/debtasset/SLM-Loan-Trusts/06-10/
2009-CT/09CTqt0314c.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY52-DLLS]; Austin C. Smith, The Looming
Collapse of Student Loan Asset Backed Securities, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 13, 2017, 2:11
PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/the-looming-collapse-of-student-
loan-asset-backed-securities [https://perma.cc/92PB-MEBG].
229. SLM Private Education Loan Trust 2009-CT: Monthly Servicing Report, supra note
228.
230. Barbara A. Lambotte & Corey Henry, Rating Action: Moody’s Rates SLM Private
Education Loan Trust 2009-CT, MOODY’S (Dec. 11, 2009), https://www.moodys.com/re-
search/Moodys-rates-SLM-Private-Education-Loan-Trust-2009-CT—PR_191847 [https://
perma.cc/ZWE9-PZKX].
231. See Stephanie Aaronson & Francisca Alba, Unemployment Among Young Work-
ers During COVID-19, BROOKINGS (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
unemployment-among-young-workers-during-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/PL92-WZB3]
(identifying how the pandemic has impacted young workers and particularly young people
of color); Kochhar, supra note 188 (noting that in the first three months of the pandemic,
unemployment rose higher than it did in two years of the 2008 recession); Tony Romm,
Americans Have Filed More Than 40 Million Jobless Claims in Past 10 Weeks as Another
2.1 Million Filed for Benefits Last Week, WASH. POST (May 28, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/28/unemployment-claims-coronavirus/ [https://
perma.cc/SGJ6-7U3J] (reporting that forty million Americans—over 12% of the U.S. pop-
ulation—have filed for unemployment in the last ten weeks alone). The CARES Act relief
granted for borrowers was slated to end on September 30, 2020, but was extended to De-
cember 31, 2020. Compare Zack Friedman, Trump Suspends Student Loan Payments
Through December 31, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/
2020/08/08/student-loans-suspend-december-31/#188921725a0e [https://perma.cc/Q5Q3-
CZM2] (relating that an executive order extended the CARES Act relief for student loan
payments until December 31) with Wesley Whistle, A Surprise Benefit for Student Loan
Borrowers from the CARES Act, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2020, 10:49 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/wesleywhistle/2020/04/02/a-surprise-benefit-for-student-loan-bor-
rowers-from-the-cares-act/#1d43d44a4909 [https://perma.cc/ME68-SYSB] (discussing the
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default rate in a short period of time will undoubtedly strain SLABS issu-
ers’ ability to pay their investors on a scale that has never before been
seen. Also, borrowers, whose loans back SLABS, are already finding
themselves faced with mounting expenses that impact their ability to
make future loan payments.232 Many will default, and they could turn to
the bankruptcy courts for relief. It has been said that the law moves
slowly, but other courts will surely follow the lead of the two federal cir-
cuit courts of appeal and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York in its Rosenberg decision—allowing borrowers to
discharge their student loans via the bankruptcy process—particularly if
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirms the Rosenberg decision.233
Both of these possibilities—if not likelihoods—would ignite the inflam-
mable student loan sector and place the safe investment tag on SLABS in
serious doubt. It is likely a question of when, not if, the SLABS market
will collapse, and when it does, private student lending will be crippled,
carrying serious negative effects for student borrowers and the colleges
they attend. If the 2008 recession was any indication, these developments
could happen very quickly and ripple into the rest of the United States’
economy, due to the sheer size and scope of student loan debt in relation
to overall consumer debt.234
V. CONCLUSION
Crisis rhetoric is perhaps appropriate to describe the student loan sec-
tor, given the staggering proportion of overall consumer debt in the
United States accounted for by student loan debt. Yet, student loans are
categorically different from other credit products in that—very often—
they do not require the borrower to fully repay their debt obligation.235
That is, a majority of student loans enjoy federal backing and contractu-
student loan relief provided under the CARES Act and noting that it runs until the end of
September).
232. Kaufman, supra, note 81 (“The dollar value of private student loans in forbearance
exploded, increasing as much as 1360 percent [from January to May of 2020]. . . . Com-
pared to the period prior to the pandemic, the overall number of loans whose borrowers
are not making any progress toward repayment increased more than 36 percent.” (empha-
sis omitted)).
233. It seems that judges may have already turned the page on using the bankruptcy
process to preclude student loan discharge. See Katy Stech Ferek, Judges Wouldn’t Con-
sider Forgiving Crippling Student Loans—Until Now, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2018, 7:00
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-wouldnt-consider-forgiving-crippling-student-
loans-until-now-1528974001 [https://perma.cc/NTW5-RJQD] (interviewing more than fifty
current and former bankruptcy judges and finding that they are now actively seeking to
help debtors, in many cases because they have seen that their law clerks are so heavily
mired in student loan debt).
234. See Stein & Duvall, supra note 14; see also Cox et al., supra note 219; Kenneth
Duvall & Philip R. Stein, COVID-19: What Market Bubbles Will It Burst?, JDSUPRA (Mar.
23, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/covid-19-what-market-bubbles-will-it-59678/
[https://perma.cc/QF2A-2BYV].
235. See, e.g., John R. Brooks & Adam J. Levitin, Redesigning Education Finance: How
Student Loans Outgrew the “Debt” Paradigm, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (describ-
ing the uniqueness of student loans’ debt forgiveness as being “baked into the student loan
product” and arguing that “the economic structure of student loans has evolved to resem-
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ally backed forgiveness features, which most other types of consumer
debt—including some types of student loan debt—do not. However, un-
like other forms of consumer debt, student loans have historically locked
borrowers into full debt obligation repayment by virtue of their virtual
nondischargeability in bankruptcy proceedings, which in turn has
propped up a robust SLABS market.
It is almost poetic that the same court that handed down the Brunner
decision in 1985, which established the virtual prohibition on student loan
discharge in bankruptcy proceedings, may be among the handful of courts
to begin the work of its undoing thirty-five years later.236 The ability to
discharge student loans utilizing the existing bankruptcy framework
seems to be one obvious solution for mitigating the student loan crisis for
borrowers.237 Allowing student loan discharge via bankruptcy can poten-
tially offer relief to borrowers who have made an effort to pay back their
loans but have been unsuccessful. However, as outlined above, allowing
student loan discharge via bankruptcy carries significant costs.
As the national student loan debt figure has climbed, the SLABS in-
dustry continued to grow in popularity. Perhaps this result is expected
because, when a security presents more like a municipal bond in terms of
its surety of return on investment, it is demonstrative of that investment
vehicle’s stability. But much of the stability of the SLABS industry is built
on false premises: the loans backing SLABS are at much greater risk of
default than their credit rating would seem to indicate, especially in a
post-COVID-19 world, and the general assumption of nondis-
chargeability of student loans in bankruptcy proceedings is in question
after the Rosenberg decision and its companion decisions in the federal
circuit courts of appeal. Each of these realities makes these “low-risk”
investments much risker and points to the possibility that the entire
SLABS market could collapse. Besides merely introducing a greater level
of risk in the SLABS market, what effect, then, could these developments
carry?
Predicting the economic impacts of COVID-19 and the impact of the
federal court decisions concluding that student loans are dischargeable in
bankruptcy proceedings relies somewhat on speculation, but their poten-
tial to disturb the SLABS market, as well as other sectors of the econ-
omy, bears due consideration, especially during the present moment of
economic uncertainty at the early stages of yet another economic reces-
ble a federal grant program coupled with a progressive income-based tax on recipients,
rather than a true debt product”).
236. Note that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
handed down both Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46
B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam), and Ro-
senberg v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Rosenberg), 610 B.R. 454, 457
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).
237. See, e.g., Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics in 2019: A $1.5 Trillion Cri-
sis, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/02/
25/student-loan-debt-statistics-2019/#235d048b133f [https://perma.cc/RC97-QNZT].
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sion.238 However, if the 2008 recession is predictive, it is likely to unfold
in a couple of ways. Ultimately, how the recent decisions to permit stu-
dent loan discharge in bankruptcy could impact the SLABS market and
the economy relates to the distinction between secured loans and un-
secured loans. Under one possible scenario, similar to the 2008 recession,
lenders could be forced to bear the brunt of their losses from student
loans discharged in bankruptcy. While accountability can potentially in-
centivize lenders to use better and safer lending standards, this type of so-
called accountability, in the aggregate, leads to deeper economic reces-
sions because financial institutions cannot operate as usual when suffer-
ing those types of losses. In this scenario, many borrowers seeking loans
may be unable to do so. On the other hand, these recent federal court
decisions alone could result in heavy tax consequences for taxpayers in
the United States. Student loans are unsecured because many are guaran-
teed by the federal government. This consequence is analogous to the
government bailouts of lenders offering federally backed mortgage pro-
grams.239 In this scenario, a wave of student loan debts discharged in
bankruptcy could potentially result in more government bailouts, with all
of the burden on the taxpayers and none of it on the lenders or borrow-
ers. In fact, a recent attempt by the U.S. Department of Education to
intercept and seize $2.2 billion in tax refunds from student loan borrow-
ers was thwarted in a class-action lawsuit brought by those borrowers,
and the refunds were returned to the borrowers.240 In effect, the govern-
ment’s attempt to offset its obligations of federal backing by collecting on
the loans via government-issued tax refunds demonstrates how tenuous
the government’s federal-backing guarantee is in the context of student
loans. But such a bailout would only protect FFELP loans marketed as
SLABS, not the remaining majority of private loans that back SLABS.
Thus, SLABS investors could bear considerable losses if a wave of private
student-loan borrowers default.
In either event, the weight of the Rosenberg ruling, and those like it in
the federal circuit courts of appeal, may ultimately contribute to the col-
lapse of the SLABS market. Just three months into the COVID-19 pan-
238. Alan Rappeport & Jeanna Smialek, I.M.F. Predicts Worst Downturn Since the
Great Depression, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/us/
politics/coronavirus-economy-recession-depression.html [https://perma.cc/Q25Q-4VB2];
Elizabeth Schulze, The Coronavirus Recession Is Unlike Any Economic Downturn in US
History, CNBC (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:33 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/coronavirus-re-
cession-is-unlike-any-economic-downturn-in-us-history.html [https://perma.cc/Z8SC-
GVH5].
239. Federally-backed mortgage programs include options to obtain mortgages through
the Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, etc. However, the majority
of mortgages are not federally-backed and are available through private lenders.
240. Despite the fact that the collection of student loans was expressly prohibited under
the CARES Act, the U.S. Department of Education has admitted to offsetting more than
one million student loan borrowers’ tax refunds in the middle of the pandemic. See, e.g.,
Adam S. Minsky, Dept. of Education Discloses Illegal Seizure of $2.2 Billion from Student
Loan Borrowers, FORBES (June 1, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammin-
sky/2020/06/01/dept-of-education-discloses-illegal-seizure-of-22-billion-from-student-loan-
borrowers/#7568c1d05ede [https://perma.cc/8FPN-VMWK].
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demic, many borrowers who have made good faith efforts to repay their
loans have found that their expenses exceed their income. They have en-
tered forbearance or delinquency, which will ultimately lead to default.
When more borrowers become able to discharge their student loans in
bankruptcy, the basis upon which the entire SLABS market is pre-
mised—i.e., low-risk investments due to nondischargeability of loans
through bankruptcy proceedings—fails. Thus, the risk level associated
with SLABS will undoubtedly increase if it has not risen already.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, all student loan payments—
on both principal balance and interest—were suspended through Decem-
ber 31, 2020.241 But this relief is temporary and quickly reaching its termi-
nation date. In April 2020, 20.5 million jobs were lost and, as a result, the
national unemployment rate jumped to 14.7%, the highest unemploy-
ment rate since the Great Depression.242 Increased unemployment rates
will foreseeably lead to an increased likelihood that a multitude of bor-
rowers will begin having trouble repaying their student loans. Without
employment prospects or steady earnings, many of these borrowers could
default on their student loans, ultimately need to file for bankruptcy, and
may have their student loan debts discharged. Although nothing is certain
in these uncertain times, it is increasingly difficult to shake the feeling
that history will repeat itself in just twelve years’ time. If it does, the stu-
dent loan debt crisis could have greater meaning—not just for individual
borrowers, but for the American taxpayer, for the SLABS investor, and
for the American economy as well.
241. See, e.g., Information for Student Loan Borrowers, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BU-
REAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/coronavirus/student-loans/ [https://perma.cc/
DU9N-JM86]. While there is support for extending student loan debt relief through 2021,
it remains to be seen. See Wesley Whistle, Higher Education Groups Call for Extended
Student Debt Relief, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wes-
leywhistle/2020/04/20/higher-education-associations-call-for-extended-student-debt-relief/?
ss=education#70fa062d3dc4 [https://perma.cc/JM2K-NGYX].
242. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, Ben Casselman & Ella Koeze, How Bad Is Unem-
ployment? ‘Literally Off the Charts’, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/05/08/business/economy/april-jobs-report.html [https://perma.cc/AV8Y-
B4K8].
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